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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In January, 1940, a retired school teacher in Vermont received
a Government check for $22.54— the first monthly Social Security check
ever issued. In that year, $62 million in benefits were paid to 222,000
persons under the national retirement program which had been established
1by Congress five years earlier. From that small trickle, the stream of
payments have increased to a virtual torrent. Today, 90 percent of the
working population is covered under Social Security; there are more than
30 million recipients of benefits; and the program dispenses $78 billion
2annually in benefits.
The growth of the program has been especially rapid since 1965. 
Benefits have increased fourfold, and taxes to finance them have increased 
by more than five times in these twelve years. The Social Security tax 
has become the second largest source of federal revenue, exceeded only
3by the individual income tax.
Recently, the program has come under considerable attack from 
many sides. Benefit increases over and above those justified by inflation.
^"Will the Social Security Bubble Burst?" Nation's Business, 
November 1974, p. 28.
2Alicia H. Munnel, "The Future of Social Security," New England 
Economic Review, July/August 1976, p. 3,
^Ibid.
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changes in the demographic makeup of the nation, and the increasing use 
of Social Security funds for need-related benefits are threatening the 
financial soundness of the program. In other respects, the program has 
been criticized for failing to respond to changes in life styles and 
social attitudes.
The number of persons affected by Social Security and the degree 
of this affect, as evidenced by the very size of the Social Security 
payroll tax, (in 1977, the maximum combined employee-employer tax was 
$1,930) make this a highly controversial topic impinging on many aspects 
of the economy. An indication of the attention Social Security has been 
receiving is the 2% inch thick computer printout of pending legislation, 
related to the subject, for the 95th Congress. Bills, addressing all 
provisions of the multifaceted system, are listed— ranging from proposals 
for slight changes in eligibility requirements or benefits to those which 
would completely restructure the system.
The second chapter of this paper will establish historical per­
spective for current problems of the system, by tracing the evolution 
of Social Security back to the events leading up to the original legis­
lation. From the initial enactment of the law, the development and 
sequential legislation of Social Security will be delineated in terms 
of solving the problems for which the program was intended, and how this 
legislation led to the present system.
Chapter three will discuss recent developments affecting Social 
Security and various related issues, that have been the focus of attention 
by economists in recent years. A representative set of proposals to 
reform the system will be reviewed and discussed as to their potential 
impact on the program and feasibility of their implementation.
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The fourth chapter describes the author's proposal to reform 
Social Security. Supporting arguments for the proposal are based on 
equity and efficiency that the reform will facilitate in meeting desired 
objectives. This section will also discuss the implementation of the 
reform and analyze the effects of the proposal on income distribution 
for different segments of the population.
Primary emphasis of the paper will be on the Old-Age and 
Survivors Insurance (CAST) portion of the Old-Age, Survivors, Disability 
and Health Insurance (OASDHI) program. Less attention will be given to 
the disability and health programs in the system.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I I
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
The Social Security Act was signed into law by President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 14, 1935. Enactment of the law and the 
intent of its provisions were in response to a changing life style in 
the United States and the devastating effects of the Great Depression 
on some segments of society. The United States, in passing the Social 
Security Act, followed the example of most developed nations of the 
world by enlarging the role of government in providing for the welfare 
of its citizens.
The structure of the original Social Security Act was largely 
shaped by the history and traditions of the United States. In its 
early history, the United States was a predominantly agricultural 
economy- The family was the basic economic unit and the livelihood of 
the family was derived primarily from the soil, producing most of what 
it consumed. Economic hardships of personal misfortunes and old age 
were minimized by the closeness of the family unit and community ties. 
Because families were large, children could provide for their aging 
parents when their parents could no longer work.
The plethora of opportunities offered by an abundance of land 
and rich natural resources allowed many people to accumulate wealth 
sufficient enough to provide for a lifetime and gave rise to the strong 
feelings of self reliance and individualism characteristic of 18th and
4
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19th century America. The concept of hard work and thrift as means to 
provide for future economic needs became an American tradition.
In 1870, more than half of all adult workers were engaged in 
farming. In the years that followed, however, the nation became 
increasingly industrialized and, with the development of industry, the 
population shifted from farms to the expanding urban areas. Factory 
workers, unlike those engaged in agriculture, were totally dependent on 
a continuing flow of money income to obtain the necessities of life for 
themselves and their families. Those that were once self-sufficient 
became reliant.
The transformation of an agricultural economy into a mechanized 
interdependent society greatly increased the productive capacity of the 
nation and brought about an ever-increasing standard of living. The 
changing economic picture, however, created risks to family security 
and lessened the ability of families to take care of their own members. 
In the event the family breadwinner became ill, disabled (or otherwise 
unemployable), or died prematurely, the family lost its sole source of 
income. In an agricultural society, several sources of income were 
usually available, and all family members contributed to the economic 
well-being of the family unit.
Old age presented a further economic threat. Few jobs were 
available in the factories for older workers when the young were clamor­
ing to enter the labor force and could work more efficiently. Rarely 
were families able to save enough from their earnings for a comfortable 
retirement. The industrial age was accompanied by reduction in the size 
of families, which meant fewer children to care for their aged parents.
At the same time higher standards of living and advances in medicine were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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adding to the life span of the population, resulting in a large pro­
portion of older people in the makeup of society.
The only remedies available to the poor were private charities 
and/or poorhouses, which were notorious for their unfit living condi­
tions. State studies conducted in the first quarter of the 20th century 
revealed one-fifth to one-third of the aged were inmates of poorhouses.^ 
Public disclosure of the inadequacies of such institutions, plus the 
increasing magnitude of the problem, motivated some state governments
to adopt various relief and assistance programs for the aged.
Private pensions had been established in the late 1800's by a 
few enterprises, primarily railroads, public utilities and large manu­
facturing companies. Retirement programs for certain government employees, 
such as teachers, firemen, and policemen developed at about the turn of 
the century. The state of Arizona enacted the first public program, 
but it was declared unconstitutional. Montana was successful in estab­
lishing the first state pension plan in 1923, and by 1931, eighteen
2states and Alaska had such pension plans. These fragmented efforts 
toward a public pension system led the United States along the road that 
most European countries had traveled decades earlier.
The development of social insurance in the United States gener­
ally lagged behind that of other industrial nations. In Germany, govern­
ment old age insurance was provided in 1889 when Bismarck was Chancellor.
U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Sec­
urity Administration, Social Security Financing, by Mary Costello, 
Editorial Research Reports, Congressional Quarterly, Inc., (Washington, 
D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 714.
^Ibid., pp. 713-14.
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At the start of World War I, in 1914, ten European countries and several
3British dominions had public pension plans.
Several factors contributed to the slowness of the United States 
to take this step. Labor wages and the United States standard of living 
were comparatively higher than those in Europe, which served to perpet­
uate the belief that Americans could provide their own security. Some 
large labor unions failed to support the legislation, and the private 
insurance industry was opposed to it.
The growth of social insurance legislation in the United States 
was also retarded by the relationship of federal and state governments 
and the limitations on the federal government in this area as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court.^ J. Douglas Brown, an author of the original Social 
Security Act, stated that the chief worry of those drafting the legisla­
tion was whether the federal government had constitutional authority to 
impose such a program on the citizens of the United States.^
The economic collapse of the United States in the Great Depression, 
however, brought dramatic attention to the mounting problems of financial 
insecurity of the aged and infirm in an urban industrialized society.
Poor people were not the only ones to suffer the ill effects of the 
Depression. Those previously well off saw their savings dissipate through
^Ibid.
^U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social 
Security Administration, Social Security Programs in the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 5.
^J. Douglas Brown, An American Philosophy of Social Security: 
Evolution and Issues, (Princeton, New Jersey; Princeton University Press 
1972), p. 10.
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bank failures and depreciated investments and were reduced to either
dependence on their families or relief.^
It has often been said that the Social Security Act was a child 
of the Great Depression, during which one-fourth of the workers 
of the nation were unemployed and one-fifth of the nation sub­
sisted on direct relief or work relief. It is certainly true 
that the depression convinced the American people of the necessity 
for governmental action to relieve the human distress caused by 
unemployment, insecurity in old age and widespread poverty.?
During the 1920*s, two basic schools of thought had emerged with
respect to a national social insurance program. One group advocated a
system in which employees would contribute to a fund throughout their
working lives. Abraham Epstein, who in 1927, organized the American
Association for Old-Age Security, was a leading proponent of this form
of social insurance and is credited with the introduction of the term
8"social security."
Francis E. Townsend, a California physician, organized and led 
a second group favoring a government pension financed from the proceeds 
of a two percent federal tax on money transactions. The "Townsend 
Movement," which began in 1932, offered a pension of $200 a month for 
all persons age 60 or older, the only stipulation being that the amount 
be spent in 30 days. Thus, the plan would not only provide relief for
9the aged, but stimulate the economy as well.
^Social Security Programs, p. 5.
^Arthur J. Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Security. 
(Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press 1966), p. 9.
®Ibid., p. 4.
9Social Security Financing, p. 714.
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The Democratic convention of 1932 nominated Franklin D. Roosevelt 
for president and adopted a platform calling for unemployment and old- 
age assistance. Roosevelt, upon being elected, appointed a cabinet-level 
Committee on Economic Security charged with developing . . a  compre­
hensive social insurance system covering all major personal economic 
hazards . . . especially the hazards of unemployment and old age.'*^^
The immediacy of Roosevelt's action to establish a national 
social insurance program is said to have been in part to blunt the 
appeal of the Townsend Plan, which had developed a large and emotionally- 
charged following, but was expensive and essentially unworkable. Also, 
however, Roosevelt was a firm believer in government sponsored insurance 
programs to prevent economic hardships, as he demonstrated in his early 
political career. As a state senator and later as Governor of New York, 
he had been a strong supporter of a workmen's compensation law, the state- 
enacted old-age pension law and unemployment insurance. As President, 
his timing in introducing the legislation was probably well planned, 
aimed at selling the program to the American public before the lessons of 
the depression were forgotten.
From the first, the Committee's intent in drafting the legisla­
tion was that the plan should be national, compulsory, contributory and
12provide benefits as a matter of right. It was considered necessary 
that the program be national for the purpose of uniformity and because
^^Altmeyer, Formative Years, p. 13.
l^Ibid., pp. 4-14.
12Brown, Philosophy of Social Security, p. 10.
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of the great mobility of American workers; contributory, because of the
widely held belief that individuals should be primarily responsible for
their own security and that of their families; compulsory, to prevent
adverse selection and the resulting excessive costs per enrollee; with
payments as a matter of right so that the program would not carry with
it the stigma attached to other public assistance programs or the often
degrading means tests required to prove eligibility under such programs.
The Social Security Act of 1935 incorporated all of these criteria
and was basically a composite program of social Insurance and public
assistance. The Act created two social insurance programs— (1) a federal
old-age insurance system, now termed the Old-Age, Survivors, Disability,
and Health Insurance (OASDHI), and (2) a federal-state unemployment
insurance system. The Act also provided for a federal-state public
assistance program for needy persons and federal grants to states for
13child welfare, vocational rehabilitation and public health services.
Through numerous amendments, the Act has been modified and 
expanded in the years following its inception. Generally, coverage was 
broadened, benefits and existing programs were expanded, and new programs 
were added.
The original act covered less than 60 percent of the labor force, 
while today 90 percent of working Americans are covered under the system. 
Expenditures of the system have increased from $62 million in 1940 (the 
first year benefits were paid) to an estimated $96.9 billion in 1978.^^
13"Social Security— Forty Years Later," Social Security Bulletin, 
August 1975, p. 1.
^^"Fresh Scare Over Social Security," U.S. News & World Report.
16 February 1976, p. 68.
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Coverage
Initially, only employees in non-agricultural industry and
commerce were eligible for coverage. Certain types of employment were
originally exempted, including farm and domestic work, self-employment,
work for non-profit organizations or for close relatives, railroad
workers, and government employment— federal, state and local. Most of
these were brought under the program by amendments to the Act in 1950,
1954, 1956, 1960, and 1965.^^
The remaining workers who are still excluded from coverage can
be classified into three major categories; (1) those covered under the
civil service retirement system and the Railroad Retirement Act; (2)
household workers or farm workers who do not work long enough or earn
16enough to meet certain minimum requirements; and (3) persons with very 
low net earnings from self employment ($400 or less).
Coverage of state and local government employees has not been 
made compulsory because of constitutional restrictions on the federal 
government to tax these governmental bodies. Employees of state and 
local governments may be covered under agreements entered into between 
the states and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. At 
present, about two-thirds of all state and local employees are covered
under these agreements.
Provisions have also been adopted for making coverage available 
to employees of certain non-profit organizations, which have traditionally
^^Social Security Financing, p. 716.
16Fifty dollars per quarter for household workers and $150 a year 
(or 20 days working for an employer) for farm workers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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been tax-exempt. Most non-profit organizations have elected to waive 
their tax-exempt status.
The 1956 legislation extended coverage to the military. Non­
contributory wage credits of $160 a month were provided for military 
wages received in kind— i.e., living quarters and meals— for service 
during and after World War II up to 1956. Beginning in 1957, basic pay 
of the military service was covered under the regular contributory 
provisions of the law. In addition, service personnel became entitled 
to non-contributory wage credits of $300 per quarter for wages received 
in kind.
The 1956 additions to the Act also incorporated provisions to 
make special payments to individuals reaching age 72 with no coverage
17or very limited coverage.
Benefits
In addition to the expansion of the Social Security system to 
include more groups of workers, benefits disbursed from the system have 
been greatly increased since 1935.
Social Security, as it was originally enacted, differs fundamen­
tally from the system as it operates today. The initial legislation 
placed emphasis on the principle of '"individual equity"— that workers 
should receive out of the system at least as much as they had contrib­
uted to it.' A large reserve fund was thought necessary and was to be
X8accumulated by deferring benefit payments until 1942.
^^Social Security Programs. p. 25.
18Joseph A. Pechman, Henry J. Aaron, and Michael K. Taussig, 
Social Security— Perspectives for Reform, (Washington, D.C.; The Brook­
ings Institution 1968), p. 32.
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The original Act provided only for the payment of monthly cash 
benefits to retired workers. The amount payable was determined by a 
worker's lifetime contribution.
The first amendments to the Social Security Act in 1939 marked 
a turning point in the historical development of the Act, modifying the 
principle of "individual equity" toward the goal of "social adequacy."
In this legislation, benefits were provided for dependents and suirvivors 
of covered workers. The law was also changed to tie benefits to average 
earnings over a minimum period of time and to begin benefit payments in 
1940 rather than 1942. These changes were deemed desirable because they 
permitted immediate payment to families currently in need.
Legislation in the 1950*s both increased the value of benefits 
and broadened the types of benefits in the program. Benefits overall 
were increased with larger increases for those in the lower salary ranges 
and benefits for dependents and survivors were raised relative to those 
for workers. These served to reinforce the "social adequacy" goal of the 
Social Security system.
In 1956, benefits were added for disabled workers, aged 50-64.
In 1960, the lower age limitation was removed and benefits were added 
for the dependents of disabled workers.
The 1956 legislation also included provisions lowering the age
at which women workers were permitted to receive retirement benefits—
from 65 to 62 at an actuarial reduced amount. This provision was extended
19to men workers in 1961.
19The reduction for a worker is 5/9 percent for every month below 
age 65 at retirement. Ibid., pp. 32-43.
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A summary of the basic types of benefits under the OASDI
20portion of Social Security is as follows;
1. The basic old-age benefit— called the Primary Insurance
Amount (P.I.A.)— is paid to workers retiring at age 65 or
over. An additional 50 percent of this amount is added
to the benefit if the retired worker is married and the
21wife (or dependent husband) or divorced wife is over
2265, or if the worker has a child under 18. Reduced 
benefits may be elected at age 62.
The formula effective June, 1976, for determining the primary 
23insurance amount is:
137.77% of first $110 of Average Monthly Wage
50.11% of next $290 of Average Monthly Wage
46.83% of next $150 of Average Monthly Wage
55.04% of next $100 of Average Monthly Wage
30.61% of next $100 of Average Monthly Wage
25.51% of next $250 of Average Monthly Wage
22.78% of balance
A worker whose average monthly wage upon retirement, after 
excluding the five years of lowest earnings, is $450 will receive 
$320.17 in benefits if single with no dependents.
ZOlbid., pp. 41-44.
21Divorced wives may receive benefits if married 20 or more 
years to the covered worker.
22Children in school, ages 18-22, or disabled before age 22 are 
also covered.
23U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social 
Security Administration, Pocket History of Social Security (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.
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137.77% of $110 = $151.55
50.11% of 290 = 145.20
46.83% of 50 = 23.42
Average Monthly Wage $450 Monthly Benefit $320.17
If the worker is married and his wife is 65 or older, the 
couple's monthly benefit will be $480.25, that is, Ih times the primary 
insurance amount.
2. Disability benefits are paid after a waiting period of five 
months to workers who are totally disabled. The disability 
benefit is computed in the same way as the retirement bene­
fit, but payments tend to be larger, on the average, because 
of stricter qualifying requirements for eligibility which 
results in the elimination of lower-paid, irregularly 
employed workers. Benefits are also provided for disabled 
widows (dependent widowers) and divorced wives.
3. Survivor benefits are paid to aged widows (dependent 
widowers) and divorced wives,children under 18,^^ and 
dependent parents of deceased workers and are based on 
the P.I.A.
4. Lump sum death benefits are paid on the death of an insured 
individual. This payment is three times the monthly primary 
insurance amount up to a maximum of $255.
24Qualifications for divorced wives for disability benefits are 
the same as those for dependents of retirees.
25Qualifications for divorced wives for survivorship benefits 
are the same as those for dependents of retirees.
26Children in school, aged 18-22, or disabled before age 22 are 
also covered.
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Eligibility
To qualify for cash benefits a worker must have demonstrated 
his attachment to the labor force by a specified amount of time worked 
in covered employment. The period of time a person must have worked in 
covered employment is measured in quarters of coverage. Four categories 
of eligibility status exist.
Fully insured status is achieved by having as many quarters of 
coverage as there are years between ages 21 and retirement. For those 
that reached age 21 before 1950 the number of quarters required is the 
number of years between 1951 and retirement age. A worker with 40 
quarters of coverage is fully insured for life and needs no further 
employment to qualify for benefits. For most types of benefits the 
worker must be fully insured.
Transitionally insured status was enacted in 1965 to provide 
special minimum benefits to those who had reached age 72 before 1968 
with little or no quarters of coverage. A person reaching age 72 in 
1968 or after needs three quarters of coverage for each year after 1966 
and up to the year he reaches age 72 to be eligible for special benefits. 
In 1966, persons over 72 were made eligible to receive a special minimum 
benefit even if they had not attained fully or transitionally insured 
status.
Currently insured status is required for survivor benefits to 
be paid if a worker dies before fully insured status is achieved. An 
individual is currently insured if he has acquired six quarters of 
coverage within the 13 quarter period preceding his death.
To achieve disability insured status a worker must be fully
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Insured and have worked in covered employment for at least 20 quarters in 
the period of 40 quarters preceding disablement. More liberal insured 
status requirements apply to workers disabled before age 31 or who are
blind.27
The insured status required for each of the various benefits 
paid are listed in Table 1.
Earnings Test
After an individual retires or otherwise obtains eligibility for 
Social Security, there is a limit to the amount of money he can earn 
through employment and still collect benefits under the program. In 1977, 
a retiree or other person on Social Security can draw wages or salaries up 
to $3,000 without any cut in Social Security payments. Above $3,000, pay­
ments are reduced $1 for each $2 of wages. Benefits are payable, however, 
regardless of annual earnings, for any month in which the beneficiary earns 
$250 or less in wages and does not render substantial services in self- 
employment. Wages of Social Security beneficiaries over age 72 are not 
subject to the earnings test. The earnings test does not apply to unearned 
income such as interest, dividends or royalties.
Medicare
The most significant expansion of the Social Security Act came in
1965 with establishment of the Medicare program, which was " . . .  designed
to close a major gap in the economic security of the elderly by providing
28protection against the high cost of hospital and medical care."
27Social Security Programs, pp. 26-30.
28"Social Security 40 Years Later," p. 4.
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TABLl 1
CASH BENEFITS PAYABLE AND INSURED STATUS REQUIREMENTS 
UNDER OASDHI, JANUARY 1973
Retirement Benetif If Worker I»;
Monthly payments, equal to the primary insurance amount, are payable tot
A retired worker 6S or over* . . .  .............  . . . . .  .................  Fully Insured
Monthly payments, equal to 50 percent of the primary insurance amount arc
payable to a worker's:
Wife or divorced wife 65 or over*..................... . ..................... Fully Insured
Dependent child or grandchild under 18, or 18 through 21 if in school. ........  Fully Insured
Dependent child or grandchild 18 or over who has been disabled since
before 22................... ............................................Fully Insured
Wife of any age if caring for an entitled child under 18 or disabled.......... Fully Insured
Dependent husband 65 or over*................................................Fully Insured
Monthly payments, equal to $58 are payable at age 72 to:
A worker who reached age 65 (62 for women) before 1967  .................... Transitionally
Insured
Monthly payments, equal to $29 are payable at age 72 to s worker's:
Wife who reached age 72 before 1969...........................................Transitionally
Insured
Survivor Benefits If At Death The Worker la;
Monthly payments, equal to the primary insurance amount,* are 
payable to a worker's:
Widow or surviving divorced wife 65 or over^ ......................  Fully Insured
Dependent widower 65 or over^. . . . . .  ............ . . . . . . .  Fully Insured
Monthly payments, equal to 82.5 percent of the primary insurance 
amount, are payable to a worker's:
One dependent parent 62 or over.............................  Fully Insured
Monthly payments, equal to 75 percent of the primary insurance 
amount, are payable to a worker's:
Widow or surviving divorced wife under 62 if Caring for an
entitled child under 18 or disabled............................... Fully or currently Insured
Dependent child or grandchild under 18, or 18 through 21 if
in school........................................   Fully or currently Insured
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TABLE 1— Continued
Survivor Benefit» If At Death The Worker le:
Dependent child or grandchild 18 or over who he# heea
disabled since before 22 ....................................... Fully or Currently Insured
Dependent parent 62 or over, when both parents are entitled. « • • . Fully Insured
Lump-sum payment, equal to the lesser of three times the
worker's primary Insurance amount or $255, paid to the 
worker's:
Widow or widower, or to pay the burial expense  ........ . . . Fully or Currently Insured
Monthly payments of $58, payable at age 72 to worker's:
Widow who reached 72 before 1969  .........     Transitionally Insured
Disability Benefits If Worker Is;
Monthly payments, equal to the amounts payable in retirement,^ are 
payable to:
A disabled worker under 65 and dependents* . . . . . . . . . .  Fully insured and has 20
quarters of coverage is 
the 40 quarters ending with 
the quarter he became dis- 
abled.
A blind worker under 65 and dependents ................ •......... Fully Insured
Special Benefits If The Person Or Couple, Meet:
Monthly payments at age 72 are payable to*
A single person, equal to $58. . . • • •  ......... •........... Special requirements for inaur-
A couple, equal to $87  .................  ed status which apply only to
this type of payment.
^Reduced benefits are payable at age 62; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 5/9 of one 
percent for each month the benefit is paid before 65. Benefit amount Is increased by 1/12 of one per­
cent for each month that no benefits are payable between ages 65 and 72.
^Reduced benefits are payable at age 62; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 25/36 of one 
percent for each month the benefit Is paid before 65 (or 25% over the full 3-year period).
^Where a worker was already receiving reduced retirement benefits at time of death, the bene­
fit payable to the surviving widow or widower cannot be more than he (she) would be getting if still 
alive, except that the benefit amount cannot be reduced to less than 82.5% of the primary insurance 
benefit for widow or widower aged 62 or over. Certain remarried widows and widowers receive 50% of 
deceased spouse's primary insurance amount.
^Reduced benefits are payable at age 60; benefit amount is permanently reduced by 19/40 of 
one percent for each month the benefit Is paid before age 65 (or 28.5% over the full 5-year period).
If disabled, reduced benefits are payable at age 50, ranging from 50% of deceased spouse's primary 
insurance amount for entitlement at age 50 up to 71.5% at age 60 (the same amount payable to an 
aged widow or widower at that age).
^Except that benefits for a disabled worker before age 65 are not reduced unless he pre­
viously received a reduced insurance benefit.
*Same categories as in retirement cases.
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Social
Security Programs in the United States. (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
pp. 28-29.
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Medicare, as enacted, was comprised of two separate insurance
programs— Part A , hospital coverage for those 65 or older and Part B.
supplementary medical insurance for the aged who elect coverage and
pay the premium.
Medicare differs from other Social Security benefits in that
it provides primarily a service benefit. Part A coverage applies to
inpatient hospital care, inpatient care in a skilled nursing facility
and home health care. Almost all of the costs for these services are
paid for up to 60 days in the hospital after a deductible ($104 in 1976)
has been met. The beneficiary is required to pay a percent of costs
after this time. Part B coverage applies generally to doctor services
and outpatient hospital care and other health services and supplies not
covered by Medicare hospital Insurance. Benefits for these services are
29also subject to a deductible.
The Medicare program was expanded in 1972 to cover medical
expenses for certain individuals under 65, namely; medical expenses
for disabled workers entitled to Social Security disability or Railroad
Retirement disability benefits, and the treatment of chronic renal
30disease for Social Security covered workers and their dependents.
Supplemental Security Income
Enactment of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for 
the needy aged, blind and disabled in 1974, further contributed to the 
welfare (social adequacy) objective of Social Security. SSI evolved
29Social Security Programs, p. 48.
30"Social Security 40 Years Later," p. 4.
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from the section of the original Social Security Act providing federal-
state assistance to the poor (See page 10). Increases in benefits of
that section of the Act paralleled the expansion of benefits under the
social insurance part of the program. Initially, state-federal programs
were designed to provide money payments to the needy aged, blind, and
dependent children. The 1950 amendments added disabled adults with
insufficient income to those receiving assistance. In 1960, a separate
program was added to help the needy aged with medical costs and in 1965
a program to assist all medically indigent, regardless of age, called
31medical assistance (Medicaid), was begun.
Supplemental Security Income pays monthly checks to people in 
financial need who are 65 or older and to people in need at any age if 
blind or disabled. The aim of the program is to provide a basic cash 
income— for one person, $167.80 a month, and for a married couple, 
$251.80. These amounts are subject to adjustment if the recipient 
receives income of $20 or more in a month from other sources, such as 
Social Security, pensions and annuities. People who work can earn as 
much as $65 in a month without any reduction in their Supplemental 
Security Income. The Supplemental Security Income amendment allows 
states to add to the federal payment. In these instances, the payment 
is increased.
Recipients of SSI may own no more than $1,500 in assets ($2,250 
for a couple) in order to receive benefits. This includes savings bonds, 
stocks, jewelry and other valuables. Recipients may also own a home if 
its value is less than $25,000 and an automobile with a market value of
^̂ Ibid.
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less than $1,200. Supplemental Security Income Is financed from general
32revenues of the U.S. Treasury.
Financing Social Security
Social Security is financed by a payroll tax of a specified 
percent levied on employees' earnings up to a maximum taxable wage. 
Employee contributions are matched by employer contributions. Self- 
employed individuals are taxed at a rate equal to approximately 1% 
times that of the employee rate. In 1937, the first year in which the 
tax was collected, the combined employee-employer payroll tax rate was 
2 percent of earnings up to $3,000. The 1977 employee-employer rate is
11.7 percent on a maximum taxable wage of $16,500 and 7.9 percent for 
the self-employed up to the same maximum. Table 2 shows the history of 
increases in the payroll tax rate and the maximum taxable earnings.
Contributions received from taxes are ear-marked for federally 
administered trust funds. Separate trust funds are set up for Old-Age, 
Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI), and Health 
Insurance (HI) or Medicare. Table 2 also shows those portions of the 
total payroll tax which are designated for the separate trust funds. 
These all combine to comprise OASDHI.
Money placed in the trust funds can be used only to pay benefits 
and administrative expenses of the program. All benefits paid out are 
derived from the OASDHI tax or the trust funds with the exception of :
S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social 
Security Administration, Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, 
Blind and Disabled (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 
1975).
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TABLE 2
EFFECTIVE EARNINGS BASE AND ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION RATE
Contribution Rate (percent)
Employer and Employee Each
Beginning Earnings Base Total OASI DI HI Maximum Contribution
1937 $ 3,000 1.0 1.0 S 30.00
1950 3,000 1.5 1.5 45.00
1951 3,600 1.5 1.5 54.00
1954 3,600 2.0 2.0 72.00
1955 4,200 2.0 2.0 84.00
1957 4,200 2.25 2.0 0.25 94.50
1959 4,800 2.5 2.25 0.25 120.00
1960 4,800 3.0 2.75 0.25 144.00
1962 4,800 3.125 2.875 0.25 150.00
1963 4,800 3.625 3.375 0.25 174.00
1966 6,600 4.2 3.5 0.35 0.35 277.20
1967 . 6,600 4.4 3.55 0.35 0.5 290.40
1968 7,800 4.4 3.325 0.475 0.6 343.20
1969 7,800 4.8 3.725 0.475 0.6 374.40
1970 7,800 4.8 3.65 0.55 0.6 374.40
1971 7,800 5.2 4.05 0.55 0.6 405.60
1972 9,000 5.2 4.05 0.55 0.6 468.00
1973 10,800 5.85 4.3 0.55 1.0 631.80
1974 13,200 5.85 4.375 0.575 0.9 772.20
1975 14,100 5.85 4.375 0.575 0.9 824.85
1976 15,300 5.85 4.375 0.575 0.9 895.05
1977 16,500 5.85 4.375 0.575 0.9 965.25
Self-emnloved
1951 $ 3,600 2.25 2.25 $ 81.00
1954 3,600 3.0 3.0 108.00
1955 4,200 3.0 3.0 126.00
1957 4,200 3.375 3.0 0.375 141.75
1959 4,800 3.750 3.375 0.375 180.00
1960 4,800 4.5 4.125 0.375 216.00
1962 4.800 4.7 4.325 0.375 225.60
1963 4,800 5.4 5.025 0.375 259.20
1966 6.600 6.15 5.275 0.525 0.35 405.90
1967 6,600 6.4 5.375 0.525 0.5 422.40
1968 7,800 6.4 5.0875 0.7125 0.6 499.20
1969 7,800 6.9 5.5875 0.7125 0.6 538.20
1970 7,800 6.9 5.475 0.825 0.6 538.20
1971 7,800 7.5 6.075 0.825 0.6 585.00
1972 9,000 7.5 6.075 0.825 0.6 675.00
1973 10,800 8.0 6.205 0.795 1.0 864.00
1974 13,200 7.9 6.185 0.815 0.9 1,042.80
1975 14,100 7.9 6.185 0.815 0.9 1,113.90
1976 15,300 7.9 6.185 0.815 0.9 1,208.70
1977 16,500 7.9 6.185 0.815 0.9 1,303.50
SOURCE: U.S., Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration,
Pocket History of Social Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1976), pp. 6-7.
NOTE; OASI is Old-Age Survivors Insurance, DI is Disability Insurance, and HI is Health 
Insurance.
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non-contributory wage credits for service personnel, special aged-72
33payments, a portion of Medicare Part B, and SSI benefits. These are 
paid out of U.S. Treasury general revenues.
Surplus funds are invested in interest-bearing U.S. Treasury 
securities. A board of trustees, composed of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health, Educa­
tion and Welfare is responsible for the trust fund and reports period­
ically to Congress on its status.
The Social Security system was originally intended to be self- 
supporting, and the fund was set up as a reserve fund similar to those 
required by private insurance companies. Beginning with the 1939 
amendments, however, as Social Security moved more toward the welfare 
oriented goal of "social adequacy," the philosophy as to how the program 
should be funded necessarily changed. Since the 1950's the program has 
explicitely operated on a pay-as-you-go basis; i.e., current benefits 
to eligible non-workers are paid out of the contributions of current 
workers. These workers— their dependents and survivors— are then supposed 
to receive benefits out of contributions of workers at some future date.
In essence, an intergenerational income transfer takes place and an 
implicit contract exists between the working population and those receiv­
ing benefits, which is continually renewed. The trust fund functions 
basically as a contingency fund to maintain the solvency of the program 
in the event of a severe recession.
33Under Medicare Supplementary Medical Insurance, aged persons 
who choose to enroll in the program, pay a monthly premium and the 
federal government provides a matching amount out of general revenues.
^^Social Security Programs in the United States, p. 4.
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Because of the pay-as-you-go method of financing, the level
of the Social Security tax is set to defray the costs of benefits for
those currently retired. As benefits have been liberalized and coverage
broadened over the years, taxes have been increased. This usually
results in a nearly balanced situation in the trust fund for the first
few years, with projections of large surpluses thereafter. Before the
surpluses are fully realized, however. Congress acts to further increase
benefits, new tax rates are scheduled, and the cycle is repeated.
Overall, the Social Security fund has grown slightly, receiving
payments in excess of benefits and, up to the early 1970's this trend
35was projected into the distant future.
Through 1956 the OASI trust fund showed a surplus every year as
most of the period was characterized by high employment and inflation.
Alternating small cash deficits and small surpluses occurred between
1957 and 1965 with larger excesses in 1966 and 1967 at which time the
fund was $23 billion. Between 1967 and 1975 the combined OASDHI fund
37continued to increase to $44.3 billion by the end of 1975.
On February 2, 1976, Secretary of HEW, David Mathews testified
before the House Ways and Means Committee that outgo of the fund would
exceed income by $4.4 billion in 1976. A constant annual deficit of
this amount would deplete the fund in ten years, and many have pre­
dicted bankruptcy of Social Security in the near future. The sudden 
decreases in the fund, following years of payments in excess of benefits.
35Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 71. 
^^Ibid., p. 209.
^^"Fresh Scare," p. 68.
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is often attributed to the length and severity of the recent recession
38and is thought to be short term in nature.
Actuaries are warning, however, of even more serious long-term 
financing problems facing the Social Security system by the turn of the 
century. Two factors threaten the solvency of the fund. First, the 
changing demographic patterns of the nation— most notably the increasing 
proportion of older persons in the population— will mean increased num­
bers of persons receiving benefits. The declining birth rate and zero 
population growth in the early 1970*s will result in fewer workers to 
contribute to the fund. In 1950 the ratio of working age population 
to aged population was 14 to one. At present this ratio is approximately
7 to one and by the year 2000 the ratio is expected to drop to 3 to 
39one.
The second factor is inflation. In 1972 Congress amended the 
Social Security Act to include an automatic escalator clause to tie 
benefits to changes in the Consumer Price Index. Beginning in 1975, 
benefits are automatically increased by the amount of increase in the 
CPI any year in which this increase exceeds 3 percent. The 1972 law 
provides for increases in the maximum taxable wage to fund the additional 
benefits. The law provides, in effect, a double adjustment factor for 
inflation for future retirees. Each time retired workers get a cost-of- 
living raise in June, the benefit schedule for future retirees also is 
raised. The benefit increases trigger increases in the maximum taxable
^®Ibid.
OQ "Will the Social Security Bubble Burst?" Nation's Business, 
November 1974, pp. 28-30.
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wage, which is the amount used in computing benefits. Consequently,
some lower-wage workers may some day be retiring on pensions higher
40than the highest pay they ever received.
Administration of Social Security
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare has the overall 
responsibility for all aspects of OASDHI. The Social Security Admin­
istration, under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
administers the various programs, except for the collection of taxes 
and disbursement of benefits, which are performed by the Department of 
the Treasury, and the management and investment of trust funds, which 
are done by the Secretary of the Treasury as Managing Trustee.
An advisory council to the Social Security Administration is 
appointed every four years and functions to review the status of the 
trust funds in relation to the long-term commitments to OASDHI and to 
make recommendations with respect to scope of coverage, adequacy of 
benefits and all other aspects of the program, including its impact on 
public assistance. Council members include equal representation of
employee and employer organizations, and also represent the self-
41employed and the public.
^^"Fresh Scare," p. 70.
41Social Security Programs in the United States, p. 42.
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CHAPTER III 
CURRENT ISSUES RELATED TO SOCIAL SECURITY
In this chapter the major problems and criticisms of Social 
Security are examined in light of what various economists have written.
The first section introduces the principle issues relevant to Social 
Security. Section two examines proposals for reform from three sources, 
which address the different primary areas of concern. The proposal by 
Benjamin Okner focuses principally on providing for progressivity in 
the payroll tax and minimizing the payroll tax burdens on the poor.
The proposals by Alicia Munnell in "The Future of Social Security," 
and economists Joseph Pechman, Henry Aaron and Michael Taussig, in "Social 
Security— Perspectives for Reform," both advocate an overhaul of the 
structure of Social Security. Ms. Munnell's proposal, with the advan­
tage of having been written most recently and after the development of 
the Supplemental Security Income program, sees the goal of Social Security 
as individual equity. The authors of "Perspectives for Reform," believ­
ing a restructuring of the program, though desirable, was not feasible, 
advocated that certain steps be taken to improve the social adequacy of 
Social Security.
Principle Issues of Social Security
The most dominant and urgent problem facing the Social Security 
system and Congress— and that which has been the foremost subject of
28
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recent literature— is the financial viability of the system. Many 
items of evidence point to serious future problems of funding the 
numerous programs that have come under the realm of Social Security 
unless major steps are taken to reform and/or to restructure the pre^ 
sent system.
Short-Term Funding 
In 1976, for the first time in the history of Social Security, 
a large deficit of disbursements over receipts was predicted. Deficits 
of decreasing amounts were further predicted through 1980, and under 
the most realistic of official assumptions of the Social Security Admin­
istration, the $6 billion disability insurance trust fund would be 
exhausted in three years. The Old-Age Survivors Insurance Trust Fund, 
which currently had assets of $35 billion, was expected to be depleted 
sometime in the mid 1980's.^
These short-term deficits are thought to be the result of the 
recent recession, as well as benefit increases, enacted by Congress, 
designed to compensate Social Security beneficiaries for cost-of-living 
increases. Increased benefits authorized by Congress for the period 
1969-1976 actually more than offset increases in the cost of living.
The net real rise in benefits for this period was approximately 15 per- 
2cent. In addition, during this time period, prices rose more rapidly 
than did wages. Because benefit changes have been tied to the Consumer
^"Farewell to Ponzi? Change Must Come to the Social Security 
System," Barron's, 3 January 1977, p. 7.
2Robert J. Meyers, "How Best to Keep Social Security Solvent," 
Business Horizons, December 1976, p. 45.
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Price Index since the 1972 legislation, benefits increased at a higher 
rate than did tax receipts.
The immediate problems of funding are not thought to be irrep­
arable. A slight increase in the Social Security payroll tax rate, 
together with minor adjustments in benefits, would serve to stabilize 
receipts and disbursements of the fund until the beginning of the next 
century.
In 1976, then President Gerald Ford proposed an increase in 
the tax rate of three tenths of one percent for 1977, along with two 
adjustments to curb benefits. Under one, the student exception to the 
age 18 cut-off of children’s dependent benefits would be phased out 
over a four year period. That is, students, age 18 to 22, would no 
longer receive benefits in the event that the family breadwinner retired,
3died or became permanently disabled.
The second change proposed by Ford would tighten the earnings 
limitation rule for Social Security beneficiaries. The limit on earn­
ings a retiree can earn without losing Social Security benefits—
$3,000 a year in 1977— would be applied flatly on an annual basis.
The present rule provides that the Social Security recipient's benefits 
will not be decreased for any month in which he does not earn in excess 
of the specified limit of $250. For example, a beneficiary may earn 
$20,000 working in the first half of the year, refrain from work in the 
last half of the year, and still receive his full monthly benefit in 
those six months in which he was idle. Under Ford's proposal, this
3"Fresh Scare Over Social Security," U.S. News & World Report, 
16 February 1976, pp. 68-69.
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beneficiary would receive no Social Security benefits for the entire 
year because the earnings limit of $3,000 per year had been exceeded.
Officials estimated that these two benefit changes would yield 
cost reductions of up to $1.8 billion a year and, together with the 
tax increase, would turn the operating deficit to a surplus the year 
following implementation.^
Long-Term Funding 
Although not as immediate, the long-term solvency of Social 
Security is thought to be considerably more perplexing and serious in 
nature. In the U.S. Treasury publication, "The Statement of Liabilities 
and Other Financial Commitments of the U.S. Government," issued in 
January, 1977, the Social Security system reflected unfunded liabil­
ities of between $2.7 and $4.1 trillion.^
Other official 1976 projections from the Office of the Actuary, 
Social Security Administration, estimate that the combined employee- 
employer cost for the Old-Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
portion of Social Security must increase from the current 10.6 percent 
of taxable payroll to 28.6 percent of taxable payroll in the year 2050 
if the current benefit structure is retained. The present OASDI tax 
rate, excluding Medicare, is 9.9 percent but, as of 1975, this rate has 
not covered the full costs of benefits.^
4Ibid.
^"Farewell to Ponzi?" p. 7,
^Alicia H. Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," New England 
Economic Review, July/August 1976, p. 11.
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Because of the span of time covered in such forecasts issued by 
the Social Security Actuary (75 years as required by law), these predic­
tions are subject to considerable amount of uncertainty. A slight var­
iation in a factor, such as expected birth rate, can have enormous effects 
on assumptions as to the size and age of composition of the future popula­
tion, and hence on the future benefit costs of the program.
Alicia H. Munnell, Assistant Vice President and Economist for 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, attributes these projected cost 
increases to two equally important factors. The changing demographic 
structure of the population is responsible for one-half of the pro­
jected increase. Because Social Security is financed on a pay-as-you- 
go system, costs of the program are highly dependent on the ratio of 
retirees receiving benefits to the number of workers paying into the 
program at any given time. The anticipated increase in this ratio, 
due to the declining birth rate and increased life expectancy, implies 
an inevitable matching increase in costs. There are now (1976) 30 
beneficiaries for every 100 workers. In the year 2050, with a Bureau 
of Census projected fertility rate of 1.9 children per woman, there 
would be 51 Social Security beneficiaries for every 100 workers. This 
70 percent increase in the relative number of beneficiaries to workers 
will require a 70 percent increase in the OASDI tax rate if benefit 
replacement rates are to be maintained.^
The other half of the projected increase is the result of the 
unintended double adjustment in benefits for future retirees as provided 
by the automatic escalator clause in the 1972 Social Security legislation. 
(See page 26, Chapter II.)
^Ibid., p. 8.
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Numerous and varied proposals have been advanced to ensure the 
future adequacy of the program. Most authorities seem to agree on one 
partial remedy— that the technical error in the current benefit compu­
tation formula should be corrected as soon as possible to eliminate the 
double adjustment of inflation for future retirees. The corrective 
method supported by many economists is referred to as "decoupling" and 
would, in effect, provide only a single adjustment for inflation which 
would stabilize wage replacement ratios (the ratio of benefits immedi­
ately after retirement to earnings immediately preceding retirement).
The current "coupled" method for making cost of living adjust­
ments, changes the factors in the Social Security benefit formula by 
the amount of change in the Consumer Price Index. For example, in 
June, 1976, the benefit formula in effect at that time, was automatic­
ally changed to reflect an increase in the CPI of 6.4 percent the pre­
vious year.
Before the cost of living adjustment, the first factor of the 
benefit formula was "129.48 percent of the first $110 of the average 
monthly wage." This became 137.77 percent (or 129.48 x 1.064) of the 
first $110 AMW. The second factor "47.10 percent of the next $290" 
became 50.11 percent (or 47.10 x 1.064) of the next $290, and so forth 
through the entire formula, resulting in the present benefit formula.
(See page 14, Chapter II.) This adjustment procedure works well for 
those beneficiaries already retired, serving to maintain the purchasing 
power of their benefits at their original level.
However, future retirees still in the labor force get, in effect, 
two adjustments for inflation. The first in the form of higher average 
monthly wages because, generally, workers receive wage increases to
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compensate for inflation, and the second in the inflation adjusted
g
formula used to compute their benefits when they retire.
Under "decoupling," benefit increases would be given for current 
retirees just as at present. However, benefits for new and future retir­
ees would be calculated using wage-indexed earnings rather than past 
actual earnings. Decoupling would have little impact in the first few 
years, but would have increasing results in the future, eliminating
9about half of the long-term deficit.
Possible solutions to the remaining half of the problem are 
much more controversial and involve analysis of the fundamental intent 
of Social Security, individual equity as opposed to social adequacy, 
and the appropriate scope of the system for the future.
Short-term adjustments, such as a slight increase in the tax 
rate, and/or decreases in benefits would eliminate a portion of the 
future deficit and would probably be politically feasible, however, the 
large increase in the payroll tax rate necessary to fund the program in 
the next century would quite probably erode the support of the American 
public. Even under decoupling, the tax rate required to finance benefits 
for the year 2050 is projected at 19.2 p e r c e n t . T h e  impact that in­
creasing the tax rate would have on low- and middle-income workers also 
makes this alternative less than desirable.
An additional alternative to fill the financing gap, given the 
current structure of the system, is to raise the maximum amount of
^Ibid., pp. 8-9.
gMeyers, "How Best to Keep Social Security Solvent," p. 50. 
^^Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 15.
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earnings subject to the tax. This plan is favored by labor unions as 
it would reduce regressivity and can be justified in historical per­
spective, When Social Security began, 97 percent of covered workers had
all of their wages taxed. Today only 85 percent of covered workers have
11all of their wages taxed.
Arguments in opposition to this alternative cite the already 
precipitous rise in the maximum by 112 percent (from $7,800 to $16,500) 
in the past six years. Moreover, the maximum taxable wages will continue 
to rise without further legislation in line with average wage increases 
as part of the automatic excalator clause. Also, any boosts in the wage 
base trigger higher future benefits for those who are affected by the 
higher taxable maximum. This alternative would increase revenue in the 
short run, but long-term revenue increases would be offset by higher 
benefits.
Social Security is often criticized for diverting funds from 
the private sector, which would otherwise be saved or invested, contrib­
uting to a capital shortage. (This subject will be further developed 
in a later section of the chapter.) Increasing the maximum taxable wage 
would affect only those in the higher income brackets that have money to 
invest; consequently, capital accumulation could be affected adversely.
A third option to alleviate the funding shortage would be to 
supplement the payroll tax with some method of general revenue financing.
This idea is thought desirable because it partially substitutes progres-
12sive income and corporate taxes for the regressive payroll tax.
^^"Propping Up Social Security," Business Week, 19 July 1976,
p. 36.
12Ibid. Two proposals requiring general revenue financing, which 
have the objective of providing payroll tax relief to low-income workers, 
will be discussed later in this chapter.
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Critics of general revenue financing— including the past Ford
Administration— feel that such a fundamental change in the program
would have a detrimental psychological effect, eroding the "earned-
right" nature of Social Security. Moreover, financing from general
revenues results . . in the loss of the fiscal discipline that the
13need to rely on earmarked taxes imposes on Congress's generosity."
Finally, the projected cost increase for the Social Security 
program may necessitate a reduction of benefits, although Congress, in 
the past, has been reluctant to take such steps.
One method of reducing benefits Is to reduce the wage-replacement 
ratio. Current replacement ratios, for single workers retiring at age 
65, range between 62 percent for someone who earned $3,400 a year to 31 
percent for someone earning $14,100. This could be accomplished by 
devising a benefit formula which allowed the ratio of benefits to pre­
retirement earnings to decline gradually; or, alternatively, by simply 
maintaining the real purchasing power of today's benefits. Constant 
real benefits, combined with rising real wages due to productivity gains, 
would result in declining replacement rates and hence would serve to 
lower costs of the program.
Funding of the various Social Security programs is not the sole 
problem to be dealt with in the future. The program has been the sub­
ject of criticism In many areas especially those relating to administra­
tion of the tax and the numerous and diverse benefit provisions. The 
changes involved in remedying these problems and satisfying the different
^^Ibid., p. 37.
^^Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 16.
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interest groups under Social Security usually require additional revenue 
for the system— something which is in short supply at present. Conse­
quently, many recognized problem areas have not been acted on by Congress. 
Some of the more predominant and controversial issues will be discussed 
here.
Regressivity
An issue which has received considerable attention from econ­
omists and social critics is that of the impact of the Social Security 
tax on the poor. Approximately half of all working Americans pay out 
more in the Social Security tax than in personal income taxes. In 1975,
15 million of these Americans were too poor to pay any income tax at 
15all. Milton Friedman calls the Social Security tax "the most regres­
sive tax in our tax system." A worker earning $5,000 a year pays 5.85 
percent of his income in Social Security tax, while a person earning 
$50,000 pays less than 2 percent of his salary.
Defenders of the payroll tax method of financing Social Security 
argue that the regressive tax structure is offset by steeply progressive 
benefits, which give low-income workers bigger returns on their contri­
butions than higher-income workers. Thus, it is argued, over the life 
of a worker, equity is achieved. However, studies have indicated that 
other factors cause the poor to fare less well under Social Security.
The poor tend to enter the labor market at an earlier age, so have pay­
roll taxes deducted for a longer period of time. Also, the poor die
^^"Propping Social Security," p. 38.
^̂ Ibid.
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17at an earlier age, so receive benefits for a shorter period of time.
Earnings Test
One of the most emotional issues of Social Security is the
retirement earnings test, which penalizes retirees who earn more than
$3,000 a year (the limit on exempt earnings is raised each year in
line with average wages) or engage in "substantial services" in self
employment. The test applies to retirees under age 72 and reduces
benefits $1 for every $2 earned. Many believe the test is inequitable
because it excludes unearned income such as dividends and Interest and
thus favors the well-to-do over the poor. It is also thought that the
18earnings test weakens work incentives of the aged.
Supporters of the earnings test contend that the test is neces­
sary to be consistent with Social Security goals (income support and 
earnings maintenance after retirement). The payment of benefits, in
addition to earnings, is not to maintain past income levels, but rather
19to add to existing incomes, which frequently are more than adequate.
The Social Security Administration estimated that elimination of the
retirement earnings test would cost the program $6 billion a year and
20would affect only 10 percent of retirees.
Ibid. The problem of regressivity in Social Security is 
addressed in a proposal for reform by Benjamin Okner, which is discus­
sed in the second section of this chapter.
18"Propping Social Security," p. 43.
19Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 147.
20"Propping Social Security," p. 43.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
39
Dependency Test for Husbands 
A recent Supreme Court decision will eliminate an inequity 
existing since dependent benefits were first introduced. At that time 
(1939), the prevailing attitude stereotyped the husband as the principle 
breadwinner for the family and the wife as dependent upon his income for 
support. A wife's contribution to the family income was considered 
minimal. Consequently, benefits were formulated on this basis and the 
treatment of husbands and wives differed in determining eligibility for 
Social Security benefits. A husband is required to prove dependency in 
order to collect benefits on his wife's earnings record, but the opposite 
is not true. In the same way, widows and widowers of workers are treated 
differently, with a widower required to prove dependency on his wife's 
income. Divorced women, who were married a minimum of 20 years, may 
collect benefits on their ex-husband's Social Security record but div­
orced men do not have the same privilege whether able to prove dependency 
21or not.
On March 2, 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that differences 
in the treatment of widows and widowers under Social Security is uncon­
stitutional. This decision will probably be interpreted to mean that 
it is also unconstitutional to treat wives better than husbands in decid­
ing eligibility for Social Security pensions. The added benefits to
22widowers are expected to cost $447 million a year.
^̂ Ibid.
22"Court Strikes Sex Discrimination from Social Security," 
Great Falls Tribune, 3 March 1977, p. 1.
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Women and Social Security 
Social Security is frequently criticized as discriminating 
against women workers. Two basic reasons give grounds for this com­
plaint: (1) women workers generally receive lower benefits than men,
and (2) the contributions of women workers generate less in benefits 
for their family members than do those of men. This second point is 
the result of different eligibility provisions of the Act applicable 
to men and women as discussed above.
The first point listed is somewhat more obscure. Women workers 
do receive less in benefits than men. In July, 1975, the average Social 
Security benefit for retired women workers was $180 as compared to an 
average of $225 for retired male workers. The reason for this is that 
a disproportionate number of women work in low-paying and/or part-time 
jobs even when they are the principle breadwinner for the family. In 
addition, women's careers in employment outside of the home are fre­
quently interrupted to have and raise children. Because benefits are 
based on average monthly wages earned between age 22 and retirement 
(minus the 5 years of lowest earnings), the earnings histories of women 
workers often have large gaps in years where little or no wages were 
paid in covered employment. Yet these years with zero wages, to the
extent that there are more than five, are included in averaging earnings
23to compute benefits.
23U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Committee on Aging, Women and 
Social Security: Adapting to a New Era, prepared by the Task Force on
Women and Social Security, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.; 
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 19-34.
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Wives of deceased workers with large families often choose to 
stay at home to raise children and collect benefits payable to widows 
with dependent children. These benefits are removed, however, when 
children reach age 18 or 22, if they are students. The former homemaker 
is then required to find employment outside of the home, and is often 
forced to accept low-paying jobs because of her age and lack of employ­
able skills when entering the labor market.
Due to the frequent interruption of careers in covered employ­
ment, women are also less likely to qualify for disability benefits, 
because this requires disability insured status, e.g., 20 quarters of 
coverage during the 40 quarter period preceding disablement.
The provisions of the Act (other than those relating to eligi­
bility) do not specifically discriminate as to sex. In the beginning. 
Social Security was primarily oriented toward individual equity, and 
it was considered necessary that workers prove their attachment to the 
labor force in order to receive benefits— hence the provisions for 
computing average monthly wage and eligibility for disability require­
ments. The provisions have major impact on women because of prevail­
ing social and economic employment habits. Some provisions, such as 
the progressive benefit formula and the minimum benefit, are designed 
to help those with low wages and substantial periods of unemployment.
The average benefit paid to retired women represents a higher proportion
24of her past earnings than does the average benefit of retired men.
A final criticism of Social Security, with respect to the treat­
ment of women, is the failure of the system to assign any economic value
^̂ Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
to the role of homemaker. Women, who remain out of the labor force to 
care for children and manage the household, contribute to the economic 
welfare of the family but do not receive credit for this under Social 
Security. Consequently, the homemaker must depend on her spouse’s 
earnings record for Social Security benefits, which may be very meager, 
or none, if she is divorced before 20 years of marriage.
A bill introduced in Congress in February, 1977, by Representa­
tive Donald Fraser of Minnesota, addresses this problem. The bill would 
provide an option available to all married couples by which the homemaker
would share 50-50 in Social Security credits based on the spouse’s 
25covered earnings.
Social Security and Capital Accumulation
Martin Feldstein, professor of economics at Harvard University,
has criticized Social Security, because he believes, as many economists
do, that it depresses private savings and thus Inhibits capital accumu-
26lation and investment necessary for satisfactory economic growth.
An econometric study, which Mr. Feldstein conducted of U.S. 
savings behavior since 1929, indicated that Social Security does sub­
stantially lower private saving. His statistical estimates indicate 
that Social Security reduces private saving by about 35 percent. In 
essence, current workers have decided to save less because they expect 
to receive Social Security pensions. Also, because of the pay-as-you- 
go method of financing the program, there is very little public saving
25U.S., Congress, House, A Bill to Provide Equity in Social 
Security for Individuals and Families, H.R. 3247, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 
1977.
26"Propping Social Security," p. 38.
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to offset this drop in private saving. The 35 percent reduction in
private savings implies that, in the long run, capital stock will be
2735 percent smaller than it otherwise would be.
Mr. Feldstein recommends the accumulation of a larger Social
Security trust fund by means of a 2-4 percent rise in the tax rate.
In conjunction with this, the rate at which benefits are now allowed
to increase must be restricted. He estimates a 2 percent rise in the
tax rate would produce a surplus in the fund of $15 billion a year,
which could be used to buy government debt. The increased capital
formation would result in higher production and lower unemployment,
28and eventually reduce the system's need for tax revenues.
Proposals for Reform
Benjamin A- Okner
Mr. Okner's proposals primarily address the goals of providing
payroll tax relief for the poor through the alteration of the propor-
29tional Social Security tax to make it progressive. (The statistics 
used in all three proposals to be discussed are based on 1975 tax, 
earnings and population data.)
Reform within existing payroll tax structure
Okner's first proposal calls for the introduction into the pay­
roll tax of a $1,300 standard deduction plus a $750 exemption for each
27Martin Feldstein, "Social Security, Tax Reform and Capital 
Accumulation," Tax Review, February 1976, pp. 5-8.
^®Ibid.
29The following material is taken from Benjamin A. Okner, The 
Social Security Payroll Tax: Some Alternatives for Reform," The Journal
of Finance, 30 (May 1975): 567-578.
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dependent as In the personal income tax. These need not be the same as 
those used in income tax computation and lower exemptions would decrease 
the amount of revenue loss; however, lower exemptions would also dec­
rease progressivity. If lower exemptions are used, Okner suggests this 
feature be combined with a progressive rate structure.
Under any one of these options, exemptions may or may not be 
phased out at higher income levels, i.e., reduction of the exemption 
of $1 for every $2 that income is above the exemption level. Phasing 
out the exemption as income rises produces a "hump" in marginal tax 
rates, i.e., in a family of four, using a standard deduction of $1,300 
and a $750 exemption per dependent, the marginal tax rate on earnings 
below $4,300 is zero; 8.775 percent on earnings from $4,300 to $12,900 
5.85 percent on earnings from $12,900 to the ceiling, and zero on earn­
ings from the ceiling up. The alternative is to have the full exemption 
granted to all taxpayers. If this were done, the "hump" would be elimin­
ated but at a greater revenue loss.
Okner estimated that implementation of these plans in 1975 
would have decreased Social Security payroll tax revenue by $5 billion, 
with the exemption phaseout, compared to $14 billion without the phase­
out. Two methods were suggested for recouping this lost revenue through 
the existing payroll tax— increasing the tax rate and increasing or 
eliminating the maximum on taxable wages. Increasing the tax rate alone 
was rejected because of its eventual regressivity. The maximum taxable 
wage would need to be increased to $19,700 to finance this plan with the 
phased-out exemption. Even by eliminating the maximum, however, enough 
revenue could not be generated to finance the plan with the full exemp­
tion granted to all.
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By comparing the consequences of using various tax rates and 
various maximum taxable wages, the author determined the greatest 
amount of tax relief to the poor would be given by Increasing the tax 
rate by 0.77 percentage points and eliminating the taxable maximum.
Under these hypothetical changes, allowing a standard deduction of 
$1,300 and a $750 exemption per dependent, the average payroll tax as 
a percent of income would drop 87 percent for those with income below 
$3,000 and 41 percent for those in the $3,000 - $5,000 range.
Partial integration of payroll and income taxes
Okner's second proposal involves the same method of levying the 
tax— using a standard deduction and exemptions— but financing the addi­
tional costs through transfers from U.S. Treasury general revenues. An 
estimated 3.5 percent surtax on the personal income tax would finance 
the phased-out exemption reform package. A 9.7 percent surtax would be 
required without the exemption phaseout.
The average taxes paid by low- and middle-income workers don't 
differ greatly between the two methods of financing, and are reduced 
under both methods for those with incomes under $20,000. Average taxes, 
under both methods of financing, are significantly increased for those 
with incomes of $50,000 or more. Comparing the two methods, the author 
favors the use of general revenues to finance the added cost of intro­
ducing exemptions into the payroll tax.
Advantages of partially integrating the two taxes in this manner 
to reduce payroll tax regressivity would be to (1) illustrate the need 
to consider the combined income and payroll tax burdens of taxpayers and 
(2) establish a precedent for the future full integration of the two taxes. 
Okner's final proposal illustrates this alternative.
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Full Integration of payroll and Income taxes
The full integration proposal involves the redistribution of 
income and payroll tax burdens in the interests of providing tax relief 
to the poor.
The implementation procedure suggested is relatively simple.
The Social Security maximum taxable earnings, tax rate, and benefit 
computation formula would stay the same. However, the payroll taxes 
withheld from the employee's earnings during the year would be credited 
against the employee's personal income tax and any excess refunded.
The proposal would result in an 80 percent drop in total taxes 
for those having income of $3,000 or less, the same or lower tax liabil­
ities for those earning less than $25,000. Tax liabilities for those in 
the highest income class ($1 million and over) would increase 30 percent.
The author argues that the totally integrated income and payroll 
tax system is the best way to increase progressivity and provide tax 
relief to the poor; however, such a radical departure from the existing 
structure may not be acceptable to the American public. The primary 
objection would be the drastic increases in tax rates required. Esti­
mates of rate increases from 45 percent to 65 percent have been projec­
ted. Total individual income taxes would have to rise 30 percent to con­
solidate the two taxes. Such an increase, according to the author, implies 
increases in marginal tax rates to as much as 92 percent which may serve 
to reduce work and investment incentives.
Alicia H. Munnell 
A proposal by Alicia Munnell involves a redefining of the role of 
Social Security, a reduction in the wage replacement ratios and an increase
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in the retirement age, which together would reduce the long-term finan-
30cial requirements of the program.
Ms Munnell suggests that two recent developments should delineate
the scope of Social Security in the future— the enactment of the Supple­
mental Security Income (SSI) program in 1972 and the Employees Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974-
Since its inception. Social Security has been assigned two, not 
necessarily complementary, roles— that of (1) providing a wage-related 
retirement earnings replacement program (individual equity) and (2) 
income support for the needy, aged and disabled, and their dependents 
(social adequacy). The program has increasingly leaned more toward the 
latter role through such additions as minimum benefits, dependent's 
benefits, and a steeply progressive benefit formula.
Prior to 1974, further assistance to the needy, aged, disabled 
and blind was provided through state administered, federally subsidized 
welfare programs. Because these programs were largely independent of 
the federal government, benefit levels and eligibility requirements 
varied widely among states and did not appear to lessen the social ade­
quacy roles of Social Security.
The Supplemental Security Income program replaced the network 
of state systems with a uniform federally administered welfare program.
In addition. Supplemental Security Income, by furnishing need-related 
benefits to the low-income elderly, preempted the social adequacy function 
of Social Security. Munnell argues, that since SSI provides a floor
30The following material is taken from Alicia H. Munnell, "The 
Future of Social Security," pp. 3-28.
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beneath which no elderly persons' income can fall, the rationale for 
having welfare programs in Social Security is weakened; therefore.
Social Security benefits can be restructured along less progressive 
lines.
Evidence that Social Security and SSI are attempting to fulfill
the same role for the same population is apparent from the fact that 70
percent of aged SSI recipients also receive Social Security payments. 
However, SSI is thought to be more efficient in this role because the 
means test ensures that benefits go only to those with a demonstrable 
need. Munnell concluded that all welfare provisions for the elderly 
under Social Security should be transferred to an expanded SSI program.
In the same way that the existence of SSI precludes welfare-
related benefits at low-income levels, recent growth and strengthening 
of private pension systems indicates that benefits at higher-income levels 
should also be limited. In 1974, about 30 million workers were covered 
under private employer-financed retirement programs. Coverage under 
private plans had doubled from 22.5 percent of the labor force to 44.0 
percent between 1950 and 1974. Private pension contributions in 1974 
equaled approximately half of the $48 billion payroll tax paid into the 
OASI trust fund in that year. Six million retirees and survivors were 
receiving benefits from private pensions in 1974, as compared to 19 mil­
lion receiving old-age survivors benefits under Social Security.
Congressional investigations in the 1960's and 1970's revealed, 
however, that many private plans were underfunded, or mismanaged, or had 
such stringent vesting requirements as to be of no value to many employees. 
ERISA, as enacted in 1974, set up minimum vesting and protability stan­
dards for private pension plans. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
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was created, which is empowered to pay up to $750 to a retiree whose 
pension plan fails to meet its obligation. The Act also introduced 
individual retirement accounts (IRA) for workers not covered by a com­
pany or union plan. Under this provision, workers may set aside up to 
15 percent of their annual income (or $1,500, whichever is less) for 
retirement. Contributions and interest received from the account are 
tax exempt until retirement. Self-employed Individuals may deduct up 
to $7,500 a year towards retirement.
Availability of private pension plans and IRA programs primarily 
affect middle and upper-income workers, and provide a way for them to 
supplement Social Security benefits. Munnell believes, therefore, that 
additional Social Security benefits for these income groups are unneces­
sary, undesirable, and would interfere with private initiative to save.
As a result of these developments. Social Security can occupy 
a unique role in the three-tiered retirement system— grounded at the 
bottom by SSI and at the top by the funded private pensions and indivi­
dual savings. Munnell's suggestion for reform would retain the payroll 
tax as the means for financing Social Security, restructure the benefit 
formula to provide benefits proportional to wages, and eliminate welfare- 
oriented provisions, returning the entire program to a wage-related re­
tirement system.
Benefit Formula
Under the present Social Security benefit formula, low-wage 
workers receive benefits, which are a higher proportion of their pre­
retirement earnings than those with higher income. This is the case 
regardless of whether their low average wage is due to low wage rates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
or short periods of time spent in covered employment, i.e., government 
employees after retirement may work the minimum amount of time in covered 
industry employment— 40 quarters or 10 years— and qualify to receive 
Social Security benefits in addition to their civil service pension.
The result is that progressive benefits often serve to augment the 
income of elderly persons, who are comparatively well-off because of 
unearned income or additional pension, and many individuals, who would 
otherwise be ineligible for welfare, receive benefits designed for the 
needy. For these reasons. Social Security is believed to be an ineffic­
ient vehicle in the role of providing social adequacy.
Instead, Munnell proposed that the present benefit formula 
should be reworked to make benefits proportional to contributions for 
all retirees. Supplementary benefits would be provided for low-income 
workers through SSI. In this way, the two goals of retirement earnings 
replacement and income maintenance would be in two completely separate 
programs.
The earnings replacement function would be performed by Social 
Security with wage replacement ratios equal across all earnings levels.
A possible replacement rate suggested was 40 percent of preretirement 
earnings.
Elimination of the minimum benefit
In 1939, the minimun Social Security benefit was introduced to 
provide a base under which no worker's benefit could fall. Over time, 
in response to criticism that it was inadequate to meet basic needs, it 
has been increased twice as fast as average benefits. SSI, however, has 
eliminated the need for this benefit and Munnell feels it should be
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phased out. The minimum benefit is not consistent with a wage-related 
benefit structure. Moreover, it is believed that many of those receiv­
ing the benefit are individuals who spent only a short period of their 
working lives in covered employment and are not primarily dependent upon 
Social Security in retirement (i.e., civil service retirees, as discus­
sed above).
Working women and dependent benefits
Married couples, in which both the husband and the wife are 
employed outside the home, now comprise the majority of families. In 
1974, a study of families in the United States in which the husband was 
between 25 and 65, indicated that in 51 percent of the families, both 
husband and wife worked in covered employment. By 1970, 68 percent of 
women 45-49 years of age had enough quarters of coverage to qualify for 
their own primary benefit under Social Security. It is predicted, in 
the year 2020, that 70 percent of aged wives of retired worker benefi­
ciaries will be entitled to benefits on their own earnings record.
Increased participation of women in the labor force raises the 
possibility of phasing out dependent benefits for spouses. Dependent 
benefits are the source of many inequities in Social Security. The most 
apparent inequity is the treatment of a single retired worker as compared 
to a married retired worker. Although two workers are the same age with 
identical wage histories and retirement dates, the married worker will 
receive 1% times the single worker’s benefit.
A more serious inequity exists in the two-earner couple, where 
the wife contributes to Social Security through the payroll tax, but 
received a dependent benefit based on her husband's earnings (if it is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
greater than the benefit she would receive from her own earnings record). 
In this way, a two-earner couple can contribute the same amount to Social 
Security as an identical couple, in which only the husband works, and 
receive less in benefits.
Such inequities are not consistent with the wage-related retire­
ment program as formulated. However, some provision must be made for 
retirement income of aged women who do not participate in the labor 
force if these benefits are to be phased out. A possible solution is 
the mandatory division of a married couple's contribution credits. In 
this way, a wife would have an earnings record of her own on which to 
receive benefits. Another postulated solution is to have married workers 
contribute 150 percent of the tax of a single worker in order to receive 
an additional 50 percent benefit for a nonworking spouse.
Extending the retirement age
Another issue addressed in the proposal and a possible way to 
reduce Social Security costs is by gradually introducing a later age 
at which retirement benefits will be payable. Munnell suggests a new 
retirement age of 68 and cites the following statistics as rationale for 
this change: The average life expectancy at age 65 increased 25 percent
between 1930 and 1970, rising from 12.2 to 15.2 years. Also, between 
1958 and 1974 the number of days of restricted activity for persons aged 
65 and over declined from 47.3 to 38.0 days. By phasing in a retirement 
age of 68 between the years 2005 and 2023, the combined Social Security 
tax rate could be reduced 1.5 percentage points by 2050.
Prevailing social and economic forces are now directed toward
lowering the retirement age because of a growing work force. However,
in 2005, the workforce will be smaller— because of the current zero
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population growth— and the number of retirees greater, so phasing in a 
lower retirement age would be desirable.
The payroll tax
A recurrent criticism of Social Security, as noted earlier, is 
the regressivity of the payroll tax. Low-income workers pay a higher 
proportion of their total income because (1) the tax is levied only on 
earned income and (2) wages above the maximum taxable are exempt from 
taxation. Munnell argues, however, that the regressivity of the payroll 
tax is partially offset by the earned income credit, a feature intro­
duced into the personal income tax by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
The earned income credit is available to low-income workers who have 
dependent children and maintain a household. Credit on their individual 
income tax return is given of 10 percent of the first $4,000 of earned 
income. The credit is reduced by 10 percent of taxpayer's adjusted gross 
income in excess of $4,000.
The effect of the earned income credit is to reduce the indivi­
dual's personal income tax by the amount of his contribution to the OASDI 
portion of Social Security (9.9 percent under the assumption that labor 
bears the employer's share of the tax through lower wages or higher 
prices). The OASDI tax is then progressive for wages between $4,000 
and $8,000, proportional from $8,000 to $16,500, and regressive there­
after.
The payroll tax, when considering Social Security in the frame­
work of a savings for retirement plan, is an appropriate method to fin­
ance the program. However, the earned-income credit for low-income 
workers is a necessary accompaniment because a compulsory savings program 
for a family existing at bare subsistence levels cannot be justified.
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The earned income credit should be expanded to include all low-income 
families and would then serve to lessen the burden of the Social Security 
tax on low-income workers.
Supplemental Security Income
Ms. Munnell recommends that the SSI program be expanded and 
modified for it to function best in the welfare role of income mainten­
ance. The means test, which currently reduces the SSI payment $1 for 
every $1 payment of Social Security benefits (or unearned income) over 
a $20 limit, would be lowered to a 50 percent reduction of benefits for 
every dollar. This would extend assistance to a somewhat higher income 
level and serve to make the cutoff point for SSI less adrupt, thereby 
eliminating inequities between those who qualify for SSI and those 
reliant on Social Security, In addition, the 50 percent reduction would 
ensure that individuals who had earnings deducted for Social Security 
would receive some return on their contribution.
Summary
The proposal for reform by Alicia Munnell suggests that the 
functions of Social Security, as the program exists today, be separated 
between earnings replacement and income maintenance.
The earnings replacement function would remain in the Social 
Security program. Social Security benefits, which would be strictly 
related to past contributions, would be appropriately financed through 
the payroll tax. The proportional benefit structure would guarantee 
that future retirees receive a positive return on their contributions.
The tax would be identified as compulsory savings, which are a part of 
net wages rather than just another tax which reduces take-home pay.
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Welfare-related provisions of Social Security would be dropped 
because benefits provided by an expanded SSI program would eliminate 
the need for them. SSI would be financed out of general revenues. The 
primary function of SSI would be the redistribution of income from the 
relatively affluent to the poor. General revenues, as derived mainly 
from the progressive personal income tax, would be more efficient in 
this function than the regressive payroll tax, in which most revenue is 
obtained from the contributions of low- and middle-income workers.
This proposal would reduce long-run costs of the Social Security 
program by phasing out secondary dependent benefits to spouses and the 
minimum benefit and raising the retirement age. Costs for welfare- 
related provisions of Social Security would be shifted to SSI but prob­
ably not reduced, and the tax burden to support them would be similarly 
shifted from the payroll tax to the personal and corporate income taxes. 
Overall, the major advantage of this proposal is greater efficiency in 
achieving the goals of retirement earnings replacement and income main­
tenance.
Joseph A. Pechman, Henry J. Aaron and 
Michael K. Taussig
31"Social Security; Perspectives for Reform" gives a compre­
hensive history and analysis of Social Security. Shortcomings and 
inequities of the system are analyzed, and the authors offer proposals 
for reform of the system.
A major deficiency of this work, however, is that it was pub­
lished in 1968, and thus predates the onset or the recognition of the
31The following material is taken from Pechman, Aaron and Taussig, 
Perspectives for Reform, pp. 214-227.
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most serious problem confronting Social Security— that of future solvency. 
Consequently, some of the authors* suggestions are not feasible now in 
light of the bleak financial outlook for the system. Legislative action 
has since been taken on some of the problems they have discussed. Two 
of the authors* recommendations for reform were implemented in 1972 (that 
the benefit formula and the maximum taxable wage be automatically adjusted 
for changes in the Consumer Price Index; and, that a widow*s benefit be 
raised to 100 percent of the worker*s benefit). Many more of the prob­
lems and reforms discussed are contemporary and as pertinent now to Social 
Security as they were at that time.
The proposals for reform of the system are divided into two sec­
tions: concepts for total reform as a long-range goal and partial reform
provisions to correct major inadequacies and inequities, while leaving 
the basic structure intact.
Total reform
The proposal for total reform addresses the basic dilemma of 
Social Security— attempting to solve two problems with one instrument. 
These are to prevent destitution among the aged poor and to assure 
people, having adequate earnings before retirement, benefits related to 
their previous standard of living. The need for two separate systems 
to handle these two problems has been discussed at length in this chapter 
as part of Alicia Munnell*s proposal for reform.
The authors of this work and Munnell both propose to retain 
Social Security to perform the earnings replacement function and finance 
the income support function through general revenues. This work goes a 
step further, however, and recommends a negative income tax be used in 
conjunction with the income support plan.
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Under the proposal, the negative income tax or public assistance
payment would be payable to all households with income below specified
levels. The minimum allowance provided would be equal to a minimum sub­
sistence standard of living for families of all sizes.
Allowances for the aged would be financed out of general revenues, 
but administered by Social Security. For the aged, the plan would require 
two calculations— one for the retirement benefit determined by past earn­
ings, the other for a negative income tax based on total money income.
The beneficiary would choose the most advantageous benefit. If the 
beneficiary chose the negative income tax benefit, the right to the 
earnings related benefit would be waived and a beneficiary would be 
subject to the tax rate on all income except a basic allowance. If 
the beneficiary chose the earnings-related benefit, he would be required 
to pay a positive income tax on the benefit and on all his additional 
income.
The value of a dual system, such as this, is in efficiency and 
flexibility. Under the present system, any attempt to improve benefits 
for income support purposes usually requires substantial benefit improve­
ments in earnings replacement, which may or may not be necessary. Since 
the two functions are separated in the proposal, either part can be 
altered independently of the other and costs of the two functions could 
easily be identified.
Partial reform
Pechman et al., suggested that changes in the structure of Social 
Security and the negative income tax would not be acceptable to the 
American public for some time in the future. For this reason, the authors 
enumerated several proposals to correct what they perceived to be most
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severe deficiencies, which were to be implemented over 10 or 20 years. 
Some of the more currently relevant of these will be discussed here.
The combined earnings of both the husband and wife should be 
included in average earnings for the purpose of computing benefits.
Since living standards before retirement often depend on salaries or 
wages from both when both are employed outside the home, the retirement 
benefit should depend on the contributions of both. The authors suggest 
that the retirement benefit should reflect the wife's earnings to the 
extent that the husband's falls short of the maximum taxable earnings.
The use of a maximum, set on taxable wages, would be retained.
At the time this argument was developed (1968), the maximum was close 
to the median family income. The authors suggested the maximum taxable 
wage level be allowed to rise with the median family income. Since the 
benefit for couples should be higher than that for single persons, (but, 
the authors suggest, possible not 1% times the single benefit) the maxi­
mum taxable wage for couples should be higher by an amount equal to the 
extra income couples require to achieve a given standard of living.
The benefit formula should reflect preretirement standards of 
living as indicated by family earnings and size of the family; there­
fore, the authors recommend the elimination of the maximum limit on 
family benefits. Under the present system, a family of three and a 
family of eight, which survive workers with similar earnings histories, 
receive the same amount in benefits. The present benefit structure does 
not reflect the fact that needs increase with the family size.
The authors' studies indicated that each additional person in 
a household required an approximate increase of 30 percent of the income 
of a single person to maintain an equivalent standard of living. Based
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on this data, the existing 75 percent of the primary insurance amount
is too generous for a surviving dependent and the family maximum for
32large families is inadequate. Moreover, in large families, the sur­
viving spouse is less able to earn income outside the home. To remedy 
this inequity, the authors suggest that a flat dollar amount be added 
to the basic benefit for each surviving dependent. In the same way, a 
flat dollar amount would be added to the primary insurance amount for 
the spouse of a retired worker, rather than a 50 percent increment.
A further problem is the span of time over which the average 
monthly wage is determined in calculating benefits. Currently, benefits 
are based on earnings since 1951 or from the time the worker reaches 
age 22, eliminating the five years of lowest earnings. Such a formula 
gives too much weight to years in which wages are significantly below 
wage levels of years in which benefits are paid. Instead, the authors 
propose that earnings should be adjusted to reflect the relative earnings 
level in each year income was received; or, alternatively, earnings might 
be computed on the highest 5 years in the previous 15-20 years of employ­
ment.
The subject of age for retirement was also addressed. With the 
improvement of health and increased longevity, the authors believe there 
is no need to encourage early retirement, and benefits to early retirees 
should be suspended in the future. Problems of those too young to retire 
but unfit to work should be handled via the disability provisions of the 
program, unemployment compensation, or both. Moreover, incentives should
32The family maximum generally prevents surviving families of 
three or more members from receiving benefits larger than the benefit 
would be for a family of three.
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be provided to encourage later retirement. A possible way to do this 
would be to exempt those over 65 from the payroll tax. This would also 
encourage employers to hire workers over 65 as they would not be required 
to pay their share of the payroll tax. In addition, provisions could be 
made to permanently increase benefits for individuals working beyond age 
65. The authors did not believe the earnings test limit should be in­
creased, or dropped altogether, in this behalf.
Finally, the payroll tax is discussed as a device to fund Social 
Security. The authors propose that Social Security, as it exists today, 
is primarily a tax-transfer system. The payroll tax is an inferior device 
to function in this capacity because the tax is levied on earned wages 
only, takes no account of family size or unusual medical expenses, and 
is regressive at upper income levels. Furthermore, the relationship 
between taxes paid and benefits received for any worker is remote, at 
best.
The payroll tax should eventually be replaced by income taxes.
The two taxes would be integrated in somewhat the same fashion as is 
described in Benjamin Okner's proposal for total integration. The 
payroll tax for employees might be retained for psychological reasons, 
e.g., to indicate to workers that they have a claim to future support 
from the system. The tax paid by the self-employed should be the same 
as that for wage and salaried workers. The employer's tax should be 
paid out of general revenues, because it is generally agreed that the 
employer shifts this tax, either to the consumer in the form of higher 
prices, or to the worker by way of lower wages.
The proposed alternative solution would be to eliminate the 
regressivity of the tax by incorporating the exemption and minimum
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33standard deduction features of the personal income tax.
Summary
Social Security faces two challenges— the first, that of short­
term funding, which demands immediate attention. The second is more 
long-term in nature, requiring a restructuring of the present system 
to meet the objectives of income maintenance and earnings replacement 
for the aged.
There are many arguments advanced as to which function— income 
maintenance or earnings replacement— Social Security was intended to 
perform. Those that believe it was originally income maintenance 
(Pechman et al.) propose changes to enhance the welfare provisions of 
Social Security. Those believing the program should be oriented toward 
earnings replacement (Munnell) see Social Security, in the future, as a 
government sponsored compulsory savings plan. The proposals for reform 
range from drastic restructuring and expansion of Social Security to a 
complete phasing out of the system— a position advocated by economist 
Milton Friedman. The following chapter will state this author’s pro­
posal for reform of Social Security, given the goals of income mainten­
ance and earnings replacement, and the criteria of efficiency and equity.
33See Okner's proposals for further elaboration on this alter­
native.
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CHAPTER IV 
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
A Review of the Problem
Social Security, as enacted in 1935, was an experiment for the 
U.S. Government in social legislation. Changing life styles, as the 
nation moved from a rural to an urban industrialized society, adversely 
affected the economic welfare of the aged. Standards of living had 
greatly improved, allowing for increases in longevity. At the same 
time, the family unit, which had previously supported its aged members, 
began losing its cohesiveness with the migration to the cities. In the 
industrialized cities, most means of support were derived from current 
cash wages. Many of the aged, upon retirement, were not financially 
prepared for withdrawal from the labor market and consequent loss of 
regular income. Ensuing conditions of widespread poverty among the aged 
were further affected by the impact of the depression.
The problem as perceived by government from these conditions, 
was a lack of financial security among the aged. President Roosevelt’s 
solution to this problem, and that enacted by Congress, was the Social 
Security program. The original intent of the legislation was to provide 
a mandatory government sponsored and administered retirement plan, fin­
anced by employer and employee contributions. The prevailing national 
sentiment of individualism and self reliance was in large part responsible
62
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for the contributory aspect of Social Security. The fact that all were 
required to contribute equally to Social Security created a feeling of 
earned right to benefits of the program. Primarily because of this 
psychological accomplishment, the program has generally been popular 
and widely accepted by the American public.
Social Security, however, did not remain in its original form 
for long. Even before any benefits were paid out of the trust fund, 
the nature of the program began changing from a contributory retirement 
program to a system of programs attempting to meet many social welfare 
needs. The U.S. had generally lagged behind other industrialized nations 
in social welfare legislation, and when the need for such programs became 
evident. Social Security became an expedient means to provide them. 
Legislation adding welfare-related benefits served to justify even 
further additions of such benefits, which, in turn, has resulted in a 
patchwork of welfare-related provisions superimposed upon the national 
retirement program.
In many instances, under the existing program, it is evident 
that individual equity has been sacrificed for social adequacy (e.g., 
the dependent spouse benefit which sometimes allows two-earner couples 
to pay more into Social Security but receive less in benefits than a 
single-earner couple with the same income). Because of the numerous 
provisions to ensure adequate benefits to all income classes, the link 
between benefits received and taxes paid into the program is very weak 
at best. Moreover, in attempting to have Social Security function both 
in the role of earnings replacement for retirees and income maintenance 
for the needy, the program has, in the past, done a less than equitable 
job of the former and an inadequate job of the latter. In recent years.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
benefits have been substantially increased to better perform the income 
maintenance function, but this has resulted in excessive costs, and the 
program under the current method of financing, through the payroll tax, 
is destined for bankruptcy in the near future.
In other instances, changing economic, social and institutional 
conditions have outmoded many of the provisions of Social Security, i.e., 
because Social Security was instituted at a time when men constituted 
the bulk of the workforce and were considered the major family bread­
winners, a man’s contributions to the OASDI tax was geared to generate 
more benefits than a woman's contributions; yet women now constitute 45
percent of the paid workforce and 22 percent of all households are headed 
1by women.
These conditions all point to the need for restructuring the 
Social Security system in terms of basic objectives, and redesigning 
the system to accomplish these objectives in a more equitable and effic­
ient manner.
The Proposed Role for Social Security
Equity and efficiency can best be achieved by redefining the 
limits of Social Security. Enactment of Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) legislation in 1972 and the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) in 1974 serve as major steps in this behalf. SSI, which 
guarantees a minimum income to the needy aged, can better provide wel­
fare related benefits than Social Security because applicants to this
^U.S., Congress, House, Senator Donald M. Fraser speaking for the 
bill to provide equity in Social Security for individuals and families, 
94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1 June 1976, Congressional Record, 122: 82.
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program must prove need by conforming to certain income and asset limit­
ations. In addition, since SSI is financed out of general revenues 
derived primarily from the progressive personal income tax, redistri­
bution of income is more efficient than is possible through the OASDI 
tax, which comes mainly from the contributions of low- and middle-income 
wage earners. The existence of SSI thus provides rationale for dispens­
ing with the income maintenance function of Social Security and hence,
the steeply progressive benefit structure and other need-related bene­
fits.
In the same way, the presence of laws strengthening the private
pension system (ERISA) provides an upper limit beyond which Social Sec­
urity need not extend benefits. ERISA will enable many middle- and upper- 
income workers to supplement their Social Security retirement benefits 
through private pension plans or individual retirement accounts (IRA's).
The role for Social Security thus circumscribed by SSI and ERISA 
is that of providing a floor of income protection for retirees. Those 
individuals whose Social Security benefits are not adequate to bring 
their total income above the specified poverty level would be eligible 
for SSI benefits. The accessability of private pension plans and IRA's 
would allow individuals with additional resources during their working 
years to add to this floor of income protection to the degree that they 
desire and are able to finance personally.
The scope of Social Security should also be narrowed to exclude 
health insurance. The Medicare trust fund currently receives a 1-8 per­
centage point share of the 11.7 percent combined employee-employer pay­
roll tax. Unlike retirement benefits, which are figured on a worker's 
average monthly wage. Medicare (Part A) hospitalization and related
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health care payments are determined by the providers of these services. 
Under these circumstances, the financing of such costs through the pay­
roll tax is inefficient and serves to further weaken the connection 
between taxes paid and benefits received. These costs should, instead,
be financed through general revenues as are a portion of Medicare Part B 
2costs. Moreover, quite probably in the next few years, some form of 
national health insurance will be enacted by Congress. Several proposals 
are currently under consideration and President Carter has Indicated 
national health insurance to be a major goal of his administration. Any 
such plan would likely supersede the function of Social Security in 
health insurance.
With the role of Social Security thus limited, the program can 
revert to an actuarially sound national pension plan in which contri­
butions made throughout a worker's career determine the benefits received 
upon retirement. In essence. Social Security would become a mandatory 
savings plan forcing workers, who would not otherwise do so, to set 
aside a portion of their wages for their old age.
The proposed changes and adjustments to the present program 
required for such restructuring are significant- These will be examined 
in terms of equity and efficiency acheived in providing for financial 
security of the aged, economic impact and political feasibility.
2Supplementary Medical Insurance (Medicare Part B) is financed 
through contributions of those wishing to participate in the program, 
with these funds matched by the federal government out of general reven­
ues.
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Benefits
The Benefit Formula 
Because Social Security would be a wage-related retirement pro­
gram, the benefits based on welfare considerations which are presently 
paid would be eliminated. The benefit formula in effect in 1977 con­
tains seven factors which are used, along with a worker’s career average 
monthly wage, to determine the worker's primary insurance amount— from 
which almost all other benefits are calculated. The formula is structured 
in such a way that low-wage workers receive a considerably larger propor­
tion of their average monthly wages in benefits than do those in higher 
income brackets, ranging from 137.77 percent for the first $100 of a 
worker's average wage to 22.78 percent when average wages exceed $1,000 
(see Chapter II, page 14).
The author's proposal would replace this progressive benefit 
formula with a proportional earnings replacement ratio. The wage replace­
ment rate would be equal at all income levels, and benefits would be 
strictly related to contributions made to Social Security. A wage re­
placement rate considered desirable would be between 50 and 60 percent 
of preretirement gross earnings. This low rate can be justified by the 
fact that living and work-related expenses decline following retirement.
In addition. Medicare pays for most medical expenses of the elderly, and 
some retirement income, including Social Security, is tax exempt. It is 
anticipated that such a replacement rate will not be adequate for all 
retirees. Low-income workers, partially dependent upon welfare programs 
prior to retirement, generally will find Social Security benefits inade­
quate and will be reliant on SSI to supplement these benefits. Higher
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income individuals, whose wages consistently exceed maximum taxable 
earnings, would be required to have additional sources of retirement 
income in order to maintain their accustomed standard of living.
The current method of computing benefits averages monthly wages 
over the working life of an individual (from 1951 or age 22, whichever 
occurs later, until retirement age), leaving out the 5 years of lowest 
earnings. The primary insurance amount (PIA) is then determined using 
this average and the benefit formula in effect at the time. Under the 
proposal, records of actual contributions would be kept for Social Sec­
urity participants over their working lives. Upon retirement, the worker's 
benefit would be determined based on these contributions and the appropri­
ate actuarial factors, such as life expectancy at the age of retirement 
and earnings of trust fund investments.
The following table lists wage replacement rates possible under 
varying conditions of number of years spent in covered employment and 
the rate of interest obtained from investments of trust funds. The rates, 
2.5 percent, 3 percent and 3.5 percent in the table, represent possible 
net earnings of the Social Security trust fund. Overall return on Social
3Security funds in fiscal year ending June 30, 1976 was 6.5 percent; how­
ever, Alicia Munnell states that net earnings on the Social Security trust
4fund are between 2 and 3 percent. The variance between these rates is 
assumed to be administrative costs of the system. Under the proposed
3This rate reflects a combination of securities purchased at vary­
ing rates. The Treasury rate, at the time this article was written, was 
7% percent, but the average rate is depressed by securities purchased some 
time ago at rates as low as 2 3/4 percent. "What Happens to your Social 
Security Taxes?" U.S. News & World Report, 1 March 1976, p. 7.
^Alicia H. Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," p. 26.
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reform, requiring Social Security to be actuarially sound, the trust 
fund should Increase; consequently, administrative expenses will be a 
smaller proportion of Investment revenue and net rate of return on earn­
ings of the fund will Increase. For these reasons, 2.5 to 3.5 percent 
would seem to be conservative estimates for use In this computation.
TABLE 3
POSSIBLE WAGE REPLACEMENT RATES
Interest Rates on Trust Fund
Years Worked in 
Covered Employment 2.5% 3.0% 3.5%
15 15% 15% 16%
20 20% 21% 23%
30 32% 35% 38%
40 45% 50% 56%
50 59% 68% 78%
In obtaining these ratios, it was assumed that the real rate of 
growth In average wages Is 1.5 percent per year. This rate reflects 
only wage Increases due to Increased productivity and eliminates the 
effects of Inflation on wages. It was also assumed that real increases 
In the maximum taxable wage will be 1.5 percent per year and that the 
life expectancy of workers, at the time of retirement, is 13 years. 
Under these assumptions and based on this table, a wage earner who has 
worked 40 years In Social Security covered employment and has a monthly 
taxable salary of $1,375, can expect monthly retirement benefits of 
$687.50 If the funds have earned 3 percent Interest or benefits of $770 
at 3.5 percent interest on the trust fund.
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Need-related Benefits
Certain benefit provisions, which have been incorporated into 
Social Security to ensure social adequacy, are inconsistent in a wage- 
related retirement system such as the one proposed. Two such provisions 
are the minimum benefit and the special minimum primary insurance amount. 
The minimum benefit was introduced as a base under which no worker's 
benefit could fall. Up to 1972 it rose twice as fast as other benefits, 
and under the 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, this benefit 
became governed by the automatic escalator clause, as other benefits.
The minimum benefit is currently $107.40.
The special minimum primary insurance amount was enacted in 
1972 and is designed to help people who have worked in covered employ­
ment for many years, but have low earnings. The special minimum PIA^ 
is applied when it is higher than the PIA related to average monthly 
wages.
Because the minimum benefit and the special minimum PIA have no 
basis in contributions into the system, and are solely a means to ensure 
adequate retirement income for low-wage workers and/or workers who have 
spent little time in covered employment, these provisions would be 
eliminated under the proposed reform. Inadequate retirement income can 
be supplemented more efficiently through Supplemental Security Income.
Effective March, 1974, the special minimum PIA equals $9 multi­
plied by the number of years of coverage the person has in excess of 10 
years, up to a maximum of 30 years. Thus, the highest benefit under the 
provision is $180 a month. U.S., Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Social Security Administration, Amendments Chart Booklet: OASDI, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 4.
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Dependent Spouse Benefits 
Dependent spouse benefits, as noted in Chapter III, are the 
source of major inequities in Social Security. The primary reason for 
this is that the OASDI payroll tax is levied on the individual worker; 
whereas, the benefits generated by this worker’s wage history are deter­
mined by the family unit. Single persons and married two-earner couples 
receive less proportionally in benefits than do married couples in which 
only the husband has worked, even though taxes paid may be as much or 
more. Further inequities stem from social and economic conditions that 
prevailed during the early development years of Social Security. Men 
were considered the family breadwinners and women, the homemakers, depen­
dent on their husbands' income; consequently, the nature of retirement 
benefits followed the same pattern. The husband's work history deter­
mines the benefits for both. Since the wife's benefit is derived from 
the husband's work record, the structure of Social Security depends to 
a large part on the institution of marriage and its permanence.^ How­
ever, as women's participation in the work force increases^ and the 
national divorce rate ascends to an all time high, different assumptions
Dependent spouse benefits to a divorced woman are not payable 
unless the marriage lasted at least 20 years. Under these circumstances, 
a woman is not eligible for benefits derived from her ex-husband's earn­
ings history until reaches age 65 and retires. Thus, a woman who is 
older than her ex-husband cannot receive retirement benefits or Medicare 
until past the normal retirement age. U.S., Congress, House, Subcommit­
tee on Aging, Social Security Inequities Against Women, Tish Sommers,
94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1975), p. 6.
^According to the February, 1976 Monthly Labor Review, the 
average worklife of the 18-year-old female in 1970 was 33.9 years.
Donald M. Fraser, "Equity in Social Security," Congressional Record.
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need to be made with regard to dependent benefits, and the Social 
Security system must be adjusted accordingly.
These assumptions are that: (1) marriage is, in part, an
economic contract between two equal persons which may or may not last 
a lifetime; (2) work records of individuals are not always static; and 
(3) taxes and benefits, to be equitable, must be based on the same 
economic unit.
The author’s proposal to reform this aspect of Social Security 
follows the lines of legislation introduced into the U.S. House of 
Representatives by Representative Donald M. Fraser (D. Minnesota). It 
has been modified somewhat to accomodate the author's basic premise that 
Social Security should be a wage-related retirement program.
Under this proposal for reform, derivative benefits (benefits 
received through the wage record of another) of spouses will be phased 
out. Instead of dependent benefits, each adult will obtain a Social
Security wage record of his/her own on which to collect benefits. Basic
to this provision is a recognition that the wife who remains in the home 
as a "homemaker" contributes to the economic well-being of the family on 
an equal basis with the husband; and, should consequently share in retire­
ment benefits made possible through the efforts of both.
The changes proposed will affect (1) married couples in which 
both the husband and wife are employed outside of the home; and (2)
those couples in which only one member works in covered employment. In
the case of the former. Social Security contribution credits earned in 
covered employment by both individuals will be combined and split evenly 
between husband and wife. This can be facilitated through the indivi­
dual federal income tax return. At the end of each year, when tax returns
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are filed, information on Social Security contributions can be taken 
from the W-2 forms submitted. Since Social Security identification 
numbers of husband and wife are included on the taw form, the contri­
butions can be easily posted from this source to each Social Security 
record on the proposed equal share basis. (Use of the federal tax form 
in this manner would, in no way, affect the federal tax payment. It is 
suggested here as a convenient method to ensure the proper record-keep­
ing of Social Security contribution credits, upon which future benefits 
are based.)
In the same way, couples in which only one member worked in 
covered employment, would have Social Security contribution credits 
obtained by this worker split equally between husband and wife and 
posted to both individual Social Security records annually via the fed­
eral income tax return. The division of contribution credits would be 
mandatory; that is, if the box indicating marital status on the 1RS 
form is checked "Married," (filing either jointly or separately), Social 
Security tax contributions would automatically be divided equally between 
husband and wife. Employers' share of the Social Security tax would be 
similarly credited, based on each employee's reported marital status.
In this way, every adult who had ever worked in Social Security 
covered employment or who had been married to an individual in covered 
employment, would have a Social Security record for benefit purposes.
This record would be portable. It would stay with the individual as a 
claim to future benefits regardless of marital status— an individual may 
marry, be widowed, divorce or remarry without losing benefits. The Social 
Security record would belong to the individual rather than the marriage. 
Because virtually all adults would have Social Security contribution
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credits, the need for derivative spouse benefits would cease. In the 
same way, this proposal would result in virtually all adults being eli­
gible for disability benefits. Currently, eligibility for disability 
coverage required substantial recent attachment to covered employment. 
Many workers— and especially females— are unable to obtain these bene­
fits because they do not have static work records. Several factors may 
contribute to the interruption of careers of one or the other partner in 
a marriage, i.e., factors related to having and raising children; contin­
uing of education; and the lack of job opportunities for one partner in 
the geographical area in which the other is employed. With the porta­
bility and sharing of work records in this proposal, adverse affects of 
these non-static work records will be minimized. As long as one spouse 
is employed, both would have current Social Security contribution credits, 
and thus be eligible for disability benefits.
Under this provision, dependent surviving children would be able 
to claim survivorship benefits based on either parents' tax contribution 
record or both in the event that both are deceased. The proposal would 
also provide survivor benefits for the spouse over 50 years old with no 
record of covered employment, because it is recognized that such indivi­
duals would have considerable difficulty entering the labor force at this 
age with no prior work experience or employable skills. These benefits 
would be based on the deceased spouse's contribution record and would 
be payable until retirement age. At this time, retirement benefits would 
be payable based on the individual's own Social Security record. Benefits 
received based on a deceased spouse's contribution record would need to be 
subject to Social Security tax in order for the surviving spouse to main­
tain disability coverage. Such taxes would also increase retirement bene­
fits, but a provision such as this should be optional.
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This proposal, by requiring that contributions be divided 
between both spouses in a marriage, will serve to equalize retirement 
benefits between men and women. (Currently, average Social Security 
benefits for retired women are 80 percent of those for retired men.)
This proposal would minimize a woman's dependence on her husband or on 
the longevity of their marriage for Social Security purposes. Neither 
women nor men would have advantageous rights to benefits as under the 
present law where men are required to prove dependency to receive deriv­
ative benefits for which women are automatically eligible.
This proposal would serve to increase work incentives. Under 
the current system, the Social Security taxes paid by a wife while en­
gaged in covered employment often add nothing to the benefits the couple 
will eventually receive. This will be the case if her average monthly 
wage amounts to less than one-half that of her husband's— a common occur­
ence because of the non-static nature of a married woman's career. In 
these instances, the desirability of the wife holding a job in outside 
employment diminishes under the realization that retirement benefits for 
the couple are the same whether she works or not. Under the proposed 
system, each person would receive a positive return on his or her contri­
butions. If both husband and wife worked in covered employment. Social 
Security benefits would be increased for both by the incremental amount 
of taxes paid. Equity would be achieved for single workers because they 
would no longer be subsidizing the dependent benefits of their fellow 
married workers.
Financing Social Security
The Social Security payroll tax, viewed as a means to redistri­
bute income from the affluent to the poor— a role currently assigned to
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Social Security— is not an effective mechanism for this purpose. The 
tax is levied without regard to ability to pay or provisions for number 
of dependents or unusual medical expenses. Furthermore, it taxes only 
earned income and exempts wages over a maximum. However, by redefining 
the goals of Social Security, transfering income redistribution functions 
to the SSI program, the OASDI tax becomes an adequate and equitable means 
to finance a compulsory savings-for-retirement plan. As benefits are to 
be proportional to taxes paid and hence to earnings (beneath the maximum 
taxable wage), benefits received upon retirement would reflect an indivi­
dual's relative standard of living prior to retirement.
Financing Social Security through the payroll tax fulfills the 
criterion of individual equity. Under this proposal, a distinct rela­
tionship exists between taxes and benefits— in order to provide finan­
cial viability to the program and also as an important psychological 
device to demonstrate to recipients an earned right to benefits, A 
significant problem among the aged is that of dependency. Dependence, 
whether on the charitable nature of relatives or societal institutions, 
tends to erode self esteem and create feelings of worthlessness. Since 
Social Security is first and foremost a retirement system for the aged, 
such problems should be considered in redesigning the system. Retire­
ment benefits derived directly from "savings" over the years of employ­
ment establishes financial independence for the elderly. For these 
reasons, the author feels it is important to retain the OASDI tax to 
finance Social Security.
Because benefits will be dependent upon contributions, most of 
the current and future financing problems of Social Security will be 
resolved. The problem of over-adjustment of benefits for effects of
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inflation will no longer be relevant. Elimination of the steeply pro­
gressive benefit formula and minimum benefit provisions will further 
lessen the burden of Social Security. The worst financial threats to 
the program, under the proposed reform, would be those faced by private 
insurance companies— inaccurate actuarial assumptions and losses suf­
fered by declining investment values. The latter factor would not 
adversely affect Social Security because of the nature of investments—  
U.S. Government securities. Although such investments yield a lower 
rate of return than corporate stocks and bonds, they are thought prefer­
able because of their soundness. Investment of Social Security funds in 
corporate securities would be undesirable because of the control it would 
give the federal government over private enterprise.
The Social Security "contingency" fund will revert back to a 
"trust" fund— as was originally intended— of the type insurance companies 
maintain to provide for future liabilities. Because Social Security will 
no longer be financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, the fund, fed by OASDI 
receipts, will begin increasing, reflecting the fact that need-related 
benefits are being funded from general revenues. A large trust fund will 
mean more money available for capital accumulation and investment, revers­
ing the trend toward a potential capital shortage, which many economists 
believe is partially caused by the Social Security system in its present 
form. Increased investments generated by Social Security trust funds 
will result in a higher rate of economic growth.
Under the premise that contributions into the OASDI trust funds, 
over an individual's career, will yield a floor of income protection at 
retirement, and that contributions and benefits should be proportional 
at all income levels, certain adjustments need to be made to the existing 
payroll tax structure.
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The current tax rate of 5.85 percent for employees and employers 
alike would be retained and held constant. The author's studies have 
shown that contributions at this rate, over the average work life of an 
individual are adequate to provide a "floor" of income protection after 
retirement. The tax rate for self-employed individuals will need to be 
increased from the present 7.9 percent to 11.7 percent, in lieu of the 
employer's share of the tax, in order to accumulate benefits commensurate 
with benefits of those employed by others. This is equitable under the 
assumption that employers pass on their share of the payroll tax to labor 
in the form of higher prices or lower wages to employees.
A similar problem exists with regard to the tax rate on a mar­
ried worker whose spouse is not employed in covered employment. Under 
the current system, equal tax contributions by single and married indivi­
duals result in different benefit amounts— that for the married indivi­
dual being ih times that for the single person. In this proposal the 
married worker, whose spouse is not employed, will be, in effect, earn­
ing Social Security credits for two future retirees. If the taxes paid 
by this individual are relatively the same as those paid by a single 
person, the presence of the taxable maximum on earnings may prevent the 
accumulation of sufficient retirement income to support husband and wife 
at the same relative standard of living as before retirement. A possible 
remedy would be to require the single-earner couple to contribute to a 
higher maximum taxable wage or at a higher rate than that for a single 
person (or married persons where both work in covered employment). The 
former alternative is thought preferable so as not to increase the tax 
burden on low-income workers. Increasing the maximum taxable wage of 
the employee by only 60 percent would result in an incremental increase
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g
in benefits of 30 percent. (This is in line with studies conducted by 
Pechman, Aaron and Taussig that determined each additional person in a 
household required an additional 30 percent of the income of a single 
person to maintain an equivalent standard of living. See Chapter III, 
pages 58-59.)
In order to maintain benefits at a level consistent with real 
increases in wages and changes in the cost of living, the maximum tax­
able wage will have to be adjusted periodically to reflect these changes. 
The method suggested to accomplish this is an automatic escalator provi­
sion similar to that in the 1972 amendments. However, this escalator 
provision will not affect benefit computation— rather, it would allow
9the maximum taxable wage to change with average taxable wages. In this 
way, contributions and ultimate benefits will keep pace with inflation 
and productivity Increases.
Since benefits will be strictly proportional to contributions 
under this proposal, it would be possible to pass legislation to allow 
individuals the alternative of dropping out of Social Security; however, 
it would be necessary to require individuals, who so chose, to furnish 
proof that they had accumulated funds of the same amount or greater for 
retirement purposes elsewhere in a fund which would only be accessible 
upon retirement. These individuals would be required to contribute to
g
The incremental benefit is one-half the additional contribution 
because only the employee would be required to pay taxes to a higher 
maximum. The maximum taxable wage for the employer*s share of the tax 
would be unaffected.
9This could be done by taking a ratio of average taxable wages in 
the year of determination to the year in which the last adjustment was 
made, and changing the maximum taxable wage by the percent arrived at.
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Social Security throughout the year (as would their employers) but would 
receive their contribution back at the end of the year as a refund through 
the individual income tax return. This provision would allow the trust 
fund use of these taxes for a year and also serve as a disincentive (in 
the form of inconvenience) for those considering leaving the program.
The employer's share of taxes for these persons would remain in the trust 
fund, ensuring some Social Security retirement benefits for them. Those 
persons who choose to save via a private means would contribute to the 
accumulation of savings for capital formation.
Earned Income Credit
A necessary accompaniment to the payroll tax in a compulsory 
savings plan, such as that proposed, is an expanded earned income credit 
provision in the federal individual income tax. This is desirable to 
provide tax relief for low-income workers. It is unreasonable to require 
poor persons to save for their retirement if such reduction in take home 
pay compels them to borrow at exhorbitant rates in order to subsist from 
day to day. The effect of the earned income credit is to reduce the fed­
eral income tax of low-income workers by the amount of their contribution 
to the OASDI portion of Social Security, up to earnings of $8,000. The 
amount of the earned income credit should be adjusted periodically for 
changes in the cost of living so that it will reflect constant 1977 dol­
lars. The earned income credit currently applies only to workers who have 
children and maintain a household. This should be extended to include 
all low-income families, but at a lower income level to reflect less need 
for this credit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
Retirement Age
The trend in recent years has been to encourage retirement at 
earlier ages. This trend, coupled with the effects of increased longev­
ity and an increase in the proportion of aged persons in the population 
are the basis for a significant portion of the projected deficits in 
Social Security. The author believes Social Security has been a major 
factor in establishing the normal retirement age by specifying 65 as 
the age at which retirement benefits are payable and requiring recipients 
of benefits to satisfy an earnings test. The introduction of actuarially 
reduced benefits at age 62, has served to further lower the retirement 
age. Social Security probably has also acted to set standards for other 
retirement programs and has conditioned social attitudes toward retire­
ment.
The encouragement of early retirement can be rationalized under 
past and current demographic conditions. The substantial increases in 
births following World War II, and continuing up through 1960, have 
resulted in a relatively large labor force as this segment of the popula­
tion reaches working age. Because there are many workers for a limited 
number of available jobs, it appears desirable to provide for early 
retirement of older, less productive workers— freeing up jobs for the 
young entering the labor market. However, the author believes the present 
is not indicative of the future. The post-war baby boom was an isolated 
deviation in the demographic trend which has persisted since the year 
1800. In this time period, fertility or birth rates declined from a 
little more than 7.0 in 1800 to 3.7 in 1960. Since 1960, the fertility 
rate was cut in half to 1.8 in 1975. Official projections of the Social
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Security Administration in 1976 assume that this downward trend will be
checked at 1.75 in 1977, to begin a gradual upswing. The fertility rate
is expected to reach 1.9 by the year 2005, where it will remain constant, 
generating a slowly declining population.
Based on these assumptions, the age composition of the popula­
tion will undergo a significant change in the 21st century as the ratio 
of non-working aged persons to those persons of working age increases.
By the year 2010 this ratio should approximate 1 to 3.^^ Two circum­
stances are responsible for this change: (1) those born during the
baby boom years will be reaching retirement age; and (2) those born in
the current period, when the birth rate is less than what would be re­
quired for zero population growth, will be the working population.
Under these assumptions and events affecting demographic make­
up, it is readily apparent why future Social Security taxes will need 
to be increased considerably, given the current pay-as-you-go method of 
financing— fewer workers will be required to support more receiving 
retirement benefits. However, in the same way, because there will be 
fewer persons of working age, there is also less justification, on the 
grounds of job availability, for continuing to encourage earlier retire­
ment.
Moreover, because of increases in longevity (between 1930 and 
1970, life expectancy at age 65 increased from 12.2 to 15.2 years), and 
relatively better health of those individuals at retirement age, the
^^Alicia Munnell, "The Future of Social Security," pp. 11-13. 
^^Gurrently this ratio is 1 to 7. See Chapter II, page 26.
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author believes a later retirement age should be gradually phased in.
A method of doing this would be to increase the age of retirement by 
one month every six months beginning in 2005 and ending in 2023, at 
which time the retirement age would be 68.
Extending the retirement age would better the economic welfare 
of the aged in two ways; (1) by allowing the aged to continue their 
working lives longer, the period over which they suffer reduced retire­
ment income would be decreased; and (2) a longer work history would 
generate larger retirement benefits payable upon reaching age 68.
Slowly phasing in a later age at which retirement benefits are 
paid will serve to gradually condition workers to the fact of extended 
work careers. It is not necessary that all workers postpone retirement 
until age 68. Many will probably have private pension plans that pro­
vide benefits at earlier ages. (Organized labor contracts now often 
call for mandatory retirement at age 60.) Early retirement under other 
pension plans will in no way affect the payment of Social Security bene­
fits at age 68— except that benefits will be lower than if workers had 
paid into the fund for more years. In the same way, individuals who 
wish to work will not be required to cease their careers at 68 in order 
to obtain benefits. Since benefits are determined by contributions and 
have their basis in individual equity rather than social adequacy, an 
earnings test determining need is inappropriate and would be eliminated 
under this proposal. Doing away with this highly unpopular aspect of 
Social Security would encourage even later retirement— past 68 for those
who wish and would generally improve the economic welfare of these indi­
viduals .
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Those persons unable to continue work to the proposed retirement 
age because of physical impairments would be eligible to receive benefits 
through disability provisions of Social Security. Procedures to deter­
mine eligibility for disability coverage under Social Security may be 
set up in such a way that requirements are liberalized with increasing 
age, i.e., permanent and total disability as a condition for payment of 
Social Security benefits under age 60; 60 to 70 percent disability, a
condition for benefits between the ages of 60 and 65; and 50 percent
12disability required from age 65 to 68. Disability benefits would 
necessarily be lower than those payable at retirement because of fewer 
years of contributions, and would possibly be further reduced by actu­
arial assumptions, as to life expectancy, at the age that benefit pay­
ments begin. Because of this, these individuals may be eligible for
13benefits under the disability provisions of SSI and/or federal and 
state unemployment programs.
The Role of Supplemental Security Income
The enactment of SSI, in 1972, marked a major turning point in 
the philosophy governing Social Security and the OASDI tax. Prior to 
that time, federally sponsored need-related programs had been assimi­
lated into Social Security under the apparent assumption that OASDI tax 
revenues were unlimited. The results were the necessary increases in 
this tax and the current projections for insolvency. By providing
12Pechman, Aaron, and Taussig, Perspectives for Reform, p. 141.
13SSI provisions for the blind and disabled of any age are the 
same as those provisions for the aged.
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benefits strictly determined by need, SSI indicates an avenue by which 
the income maintenance burden of Social Security can be removed. Al­
though SSI is under the Social Security Administration, it is fully 
funded through general tax revenues and, consequently, can be main­
tained without further increases in the regressive OASDI tax.
It is the author’s belief that SSI will provide the basis upon 
which additional income maintenance programs are structured, replacing 
the fragmented network of state-run welfare programs and need-related 
provisions of Social Security. Since SSI guarantees a monthly income 
of $167.80 per month for an aged (or blind or disabled) person and 
$251.80 for a couple, the rationale for the Social Security minimum 
benefit ($107.40) and the special minimum PIA (ranging from $9 to $180) 
is virtually eliminated. Other need-related provisions of Social Secu­
rity, such as those met by the progressive benefit formula, can be simi­
larly transferred to a modified SSI program. SSI should be broadened to 
better interface with Social Security under the proposed reform.
Currently, SSI benefits are reduced $1 for every $2 in earnings 
over $65 a month and reduced dollar for dollar for other unearned income 
over $20, which includes Social Security benefits, workmen’s compensation, 
veterans pensions, annuities and gifts. This implicit tax on other un­
earned income should be reduced to 50 percent as it is for earnings, i.e., 
for every $2 of other income, the SSI benefit is reduced $1. (The $20 
deductible does not seem to be of material importance, under the proposed 
modification, and should be eliminated.) This would extend benefits to a 
higher income level. In this way, those low-wage earners, who benefit 
from the current progressive Social Security benefit structure, will be
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protected against a decline in retirement income by the introduction of 
the proposed proportional benefit structure.
Table 4 illustrates how the expanded SSI program would inter­
face with the proposed Social Security benefit structure to guarantee 
income protection to all retirees. Income protection provided by the 
present Social Security and SSI provisions is also shown for compari­
son purposes. The wage replacement rate used in illustrating the pro­
posed system is 50 percent, which is the replacement rate possible on 
contributions into Social Security for 40 years, assuming earnings 
grow in line with the real rate of growth in average wages and invest­
ments of the trust fund earn at least 3 percent interest (see page 69).
Implementation of the Reform
The changes in Social Security called for in this proposal are 
radical. In some instances, implementation will need to be over several 
years. An initial step in bringing about the proposed reform is the 
elimination of minimum benefit and special minimum primary insurance 
amount (PIA) provisions. This action, however, will need to be taken 
concurrently with the recommended changes in the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program. An expanded SSI program will then also protect 
the income of those individuals who currently gain from the steeply 
progressive Social Security benefit formula, and thus facilitate the 
elimination of this method of figuring benefits.
Changing the computation of benefits from a formula based on 
average monthly wages to one directly determined by contributions will 
require a phasing-in stage. During this time, figuring benefits for 
newly retired persons would require two computations; one under the
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TABLE *
COMPARISON OF BENEFIT LEVELS AND REPLACEMENT RATES 
FOR RETIREES UNDER PRESENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS
Present System*
Earnings^
Monthly^
Earnings
Social
Security
Benefit
Replacement
Rate
SSI*
Benefit
Combined
Benefit
Combined
Replacement
Rate
60 Percent of 
Minimum Wage $ 219.00 $165.00 .76 $ 12.20 $177.70 .81
Low 286.58 178.50 .62 - 0 - 178.50 .62
Lower Middle 487.25 238.20 .49 — 0 — 238.20 .49
Median 687.92 298.50 .43 — 0 “ 298.50 .43
Higher Middle 931.46 329. 30 .35 - 0 - 329.30 .35
High 1,175.00 364.00 .31 - 0 - 364.00 .31
Proposed Proportional Benefit System
Earnings^
Monthly®
Earnings
Social
Security
Benefit
Replacement
Rate
SSI Benefit, 
50 Percent 
Implicit Tax, 
No Deductible
Combined
Benefit
Combined
Replacement
Rate
60 Percent of 
Minimum Wage $ 219.(X) $109.50 .50 $102.95 $212.45 .97
Low 286.58 143.29 .50 86.06 229.35 .80
Lower Middle 487.25 243.63 .50 35.89 279.52 .57
Median 687.92 343.96 .50 - 0 - 343.96 .50
Higher Middle 931.46 465.73 .50 - 0 - 465.73 .50
High 1,175.00 587.50 .50 - 0 - 587.50 .50
*The data In the top portion o f this table la taken from Alicia B. Munnell, "The Future 
of Social Security," p. 20.
^It fa aasuned these individuals had a smooth annual Income growth.
^These persons' AMW's are $157, $184, $313, $442, $514, and $586, respectively, under the 
present system.
^Social Security benefits are figured on the January, 1976 benefit formula.
*SSI benefits are figured on the benefit amounts effective January, 1976.
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current benefit formula and the other based on total contributions used 
in conjunction with an expanded SSI program, as proposed. The retiree 
would then be entitled to the larger of the two amounts. Payments to 
retiring persons, ineligible for additional benefits under SSI, will not 
be affected by the proposal for some time in the future. Nor would pay­
ments to those persons already retired change. This is because the 1977 
Social Security benefit formula currently provides an individual with 
considerably larger payments than those possible through the invest­
ment of his OASDHI tax payments from the program's inception. For 
example, under the proposal, a man retiring in December, 1976, at age 65 
would be entitled to a benefit of only $135 per month. This assumes that 
he has contributed to Social Security to the maximum amount every year 
since the tax was initiated (40 years), and trust fund monies have earned 
a net return of 3 percent per year. This compares to a PIA for this same 
person of approximately $398 under the June, 1976 benefit formula.
The low benefit obtained under the proposal is due to low maxi­
mum taxable amounts and tax rates in the early years of Social Security, 
e.g., $60 was the largest possible combined employee-employer contribu­
tion for the first 13 years that the OASDI tax was levied, (see Chapter II, 
page 23). Consequently, the proposed benefit calculation will not improve 
the payments to most persons until beyond the turn of the century when 
persons retiring would have paid taxes for many years at the rates and 
taxable levels introduced in the 1970’s. Between the years 2010 and 2020, 
full implementation of benefits based on contributions can begin.
On the other hand, the benefits to persons with low wage records 
will generally be higher under the author's proposal than under the 
current system, because of the expansion of the SSI program to extend
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these payments to higher income levels; therefore, it will be advanta­
geous for these persons to have benefits computed under the proposal.
It is important, during the years of transition, that the legis­
lation providing for automatic escalation of Social Security benefits 
be rescinded, and that no further benefit increases be made— to minimize 
costs of the program. The income of retirees with low benefits will be 
protected against inflation by SSI payments, periodically adjusted for 
changes in the cost of living. The benefits of new retirees will reflect 
increases in the cost of living, since this proposal provides for the 
automatic adjustment of the maximum taxable wage (assuming that their 
preretirement wages had also increased to reflect cost of living changes 
and their contributions to Social Security had thus increased.)
The author feels that the earnings test should be dropped imme­
diately to establish Social Security as unrelated to welfare programs.
The additional expense resulting from this will be offset by the elimi­
nation of minimum benefit provisions.
An SSI program, expanded to take over the welfare functions of 
Social Security, will require increased general revenue funding. Some 
of these funds can be obtained from reductions in child welfare pay­
ments thought possible because of the recent decline in birth rates, 
which will result in proportionally fewer young people. In addition, 
welfare costs, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, 
are expected to be cut substantially. Recent legislation, which provides 
more efficient methods of tracing absentee fathers of children on wel­
fare and forcing them to support their children, is expected to lower
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these costs by $1 billion a year.^^ The author believes SSI is an 
appropriate alternative use for these funds.
The changes in record keeping, which provide for the sharing of 
Social Security contribution credits by both partners in a marriage, 
should begin at once. These changes should also be applied retroac­
tively— both for those of working age and those individuals currently 
retired. Benefits for retirees should then be recomputed under the 
effective benefit formula. When the recomputed amount is more than 
the benefit being received by an individual, the retiree will be entitled 
to the recomputed amount. Benefits for newly retired persons will be 
similarly computed twice with the retiree entitled to the larger of the 
two amounts. This provision can be fully implemented and derivative 
spouse benefits eliminated at a time to coincide with the changeover in 
methods of computing benefits as described above.
The shared-contribution provision should increase the retirement 
benefits of women overall in relation to men’s benefits; however, putting 
Social Security on an actuarially sound basis will probably offset this 
change somewhat because of the longer life expectancy of women. Those 
persons benefiting primarily from this provision will be divorced persons, 
married less than 20 years who, under the current record keeping method, 
have little or no wage credits; and married couples, where both are 
employed outside of the home. Single-earner couples will have benefits 
reduced somewhat, and those with higher incomes will have to pay more 
in contributions because of higher maximum taxable wages.
14Sylvia Porter, "Tracing Absentee Fathers," Great Falls (Montana) 
Tribune, 8 April 1977, p. 18.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
In studying Social Security— noting the numerous criticisms of 
the system and predictions of financial collapse in the near future— it 
was reasonable to speculate on abandoning Social Security altogether. 
Economist and Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman, advocates such action, 
and would replace Social Security and current income maintenance programs 
with a negative income tax, which would guarantee a minimum income to all, 
based on the cost of living. Such a program has merits in efficiency and 
simplicity— one device to relieve everybody's financial woes— and is a 
suitable method for providing of pure need-related payments. However, the 
problems and needs resulting from reduced earning power of the elderly who 
have always been self-sufficient are different from those of persons reli­
ant on society's support most of their lives. Consequently, these prob­
lems should be treated differently. Substituting a negative income tax 
for Social Security ignores a factor which was of primary importance to 
the drafters of the original Social Security Act, and one which the author 
believes is still relevant now and will be in the future— the American 
belief that individuals should be able to provide for their own support. 
Social Security, because it is contributory, exemplifies this belief and 
projects to recipients the feeling of an earned right to benefits. The 
author believes this concept of earned right serves an important psycho­
logical function and has contributed a great deal to the wide acceptance 
of Social Security.
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Social Security has many other features which make it attractive 
to the American public. The program has complete portability of covered 
service and pension rights, i.e., earnings with different employers are 
combined to compute a worker's retirement benefit. Unlike a private 
pension plan, there is little incentive to change jobs or remain in one 
because of losing or gaining rights to Social Security. Social Security 
is available to nearly all workers and provides a floor of income protec­
tion for them upon retirement. Moreover, participation in Social Security 
generates many other benefits— survivors, disability and health.
In sum, the author believes the advantages of such a national 
contributory retirement plan are valuable enough to justify its reten­
tion; however, the potential bankruptcy of Social Security, its inequi­
ties, inadequacies and outmoded provisions necessitate a comprehensive 
reform of the program.
Two objectives were predominant in formulating this proposal for 
reform of Social Security: (1) to ensure the financial viability of the
program for future generations of retired Americans; and (2) to ensure 
its political viability and continued support by the American public.
Under this reform proposal, the conglomeration of benefits which 
currently comprise the Social Security system would be split up based on 
the function they are intended to perform. Those benefit provisions 
which serve primarily as income maintenance for the poor would be trans­
ferred to an expanded SSI program in order to perform this function most 
efficiently and adequately. As part of SSI, these benefits would be 
financed through general revenues. Those benefit provisions, which 
serve the purpose originally intended for Social Security— that of earn­
ings replacement for retired workers— would be retained as Social Security
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and be financed through the OASDI tax. Under the proposal, these 
benefits will be modified to accommodate changed life styles and to 
ensure equitable treatment of all persons who participate in Social 
Security.
This proposal recommends that a later age at which retirement 
benefits are paid should be gradually phased-in to provide more substan­
tial benefits during retirement years. This provision would significan­
tly improve the economic well-being of the elderly, along with the recom­
mended elimination of the earnings test, and can be further justified 
by demographic trends and increased longevity. It is also desirable to 
expand the earned income credit, under the federal income tax law, to 
provide tax relief to the poor.
Under the reform proposal, many of the defects of Social Security 
are eliminated by patterning certain aspects of the program after private 
pension plans. Benefits will be strictly determined by an individual’s 
contributions. Contributions to the program through the OASDI tax will 
be maintained in a trust fund, which together with investment earnings, 
will be sufficient to meet future liabilities. Yet, Social Security 
will still have many of the advantages only a public-administered pro­
gram can provide— portability, uniformity, and a greater degree of "secu­
rity" and permanence than is possible in a private insurance plan. In 
essence. Social Security will be a national compulsory savings plan, in 
which taxes paid in during an individual's working years are returned to 
the individual, together with interest, upon retirement.
The Social Security system is currently at a critical point in 
its 40 year life. The impending financial collapse and increased criticism 
of the program could together spell its doom. Before 1980, increased
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expenses will require either additional funds— from general revenues or 
tax increases— or cuts in benefits. While these decisions are being 
formulated, a careful analysis of the entire system should be made with 
attention to the long-term viability of the program.
Social Security has mushroomed into an enormous program affect­
ing nearly all Americans and many aspects of the economy; and, as such, 
no small changes will provide lasting solutions. Patchwork repairs of 
the system will no longer suffice. Comprehensive changes must be made 
in (1) the financing of Social Security to make it self-supporting; and 
(2) assumptions and provisions of the program to make it responsive to 
social changes. Careful planning of these changes can assure the future 
financial viability of Social Security and its continued support by the 
American public.
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